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SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
WILLIAM W. BRATTON†
ABSTRACT
This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning
auditors’ professional responsibility inside a principal-agent
paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors
cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of
their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject
to the principal’s control and cannot act independently. For the same
reason, auditors’ duties should be neither articulated in the framework
of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all.
These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of
the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the
shareholder and tells a particularized story about the shareholder
interest. The exercise complicates the agency description, highlighting
multiple and unstable shareholder demands that displace the unitary
model of the shareholder usually brought to bear. This fragmented
and volatile model of the shareholder provides neither a basis for
articulating a coherent set of instructions respecting aggressive
accounting nor for imposing conservative accounting. The Article
concludes that legal positivism provides a more appropriate
conceptual framework. Auditor duties should be conceived in formal
rather than relational terms, with fidelity going to the rules and the
system that auditors apply rather than to a client interest.
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INTRODUCTION
The stock market carried on unperturbed for almost two months
1
after Enron’s Chapter 11 filing on December 2, 2001. Despite funny
2
numbers implicated in the company’s collapse, despite repeated
warnings from Arthur Levitt’s Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) about the quality of financial reports,3 despite accumulating
1. For an account of Enron’s collapse, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side
of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1299–1332 (2002).
2. It has since turned out that 96 percent of Enron’s net income for 2000 can be attributed
to one or another aggressive accounting techniques. Kurt Eichenwald, Report Details Enron’s
Moves To Shift Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at C1.
3. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Renewing the Covenant With Investors, Speech at the New
York University Center for Law and Business (May 10, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch370.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing his “concern that corporate
America’s motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations could be overriding common
sense business practices”).
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4
accounting restatements, and despite a growing stack of disturbing
5
scholarly findings, Wall Street went on believing that the selfregulatory, reputation-based, highly concentrated audit system did its
job. Even as the Enron scandal crossed the line that separates mere
financial failure from criminality, traders shrugged off Enron’s
6
negative implications for the numbers on corporate bottom lines.
Then, on January 29, 2002, the market finally got it.7 A fistful of
shareholder value went up in smoke that day as the market lost
confidence in the auditor’s willingness to say no to management’s
self-serving and misleading accounting treatments.8 The market has
yet to emerge from this crisis of confidence in auditor independence.9

4. A recent General Accounting Office report on accounting notes that public company
restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to 225 in 2001. From 1997 to June 2002, there were 919
announced restatements, involving 845 companies, which came to nearly 10 percent of all those
listed. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS.,
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. S.: FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET
IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 15–19 (2002) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
5. For a review of the literature, see Mark W. Nelson et al., Where Do Companies
Attempt Earnings Management, and When Do Auditors Prevent It? 5–14 (Oct. 22, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
6. Stocks soared the week after Enron’s bankruptcy filing. Nima Warfield et al., Year-End
Review of Markets & Finance 2001: Review of What Was News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at
R12. Negative price effects of Enron’s collapse were limited to firms, such as lenders, with
claims against the company. Henry Sender & Richard B. Schmitt, Enron’s Woes May Ripple
Out to Others, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at A3.
7. Gretchen Morgenson, Worries of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at C1.
8. Id. But it was a hiccup and not a crash. The Dow Jones average opened at 9,865.50 and
dropped as low as 9,576.70 before closing at 9,618.20. Volume was up at 18,120,000 over the
previous day’s 11,868,000. The value was recovered within a few days. Dow Jones Industrial
Average Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=
%5EDJI&a=00&b=28&c=2002&d=00&e=31&f=2002&g=d (last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
9. The crisis is multifaceted and covers corporate governance generally. See, e.g., Kurt
Eichenwald, In String of Corporate Troubles, Critics Focus on Board’s Failings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2003, at A1 (reviewing the crisis in the context of Richard Grasso’s resignation as
chairman of the New York Stock Exchange due to negative reactions to his undisclosed high
salary). Discussion of problems concerning audits has abated as observers wait and see whether
reforms under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prove effective. See William W. Bratton, Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023,
1026–35 (2003) (discussing the political implications of Congress’s decision to address the crisis
by delegating to a new agency). But flare-ups continue. In 2003, the leading scandal concerns
Freddie Mac and its practice of income smoothing to disguise the risk level of its investments.
See, e.g., Patrick Barta et al., Behind Freddie Mac’s Troubles: A Strategy to Take on More Risk,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at A1 (unraveling the details of mortgage middleman Freddie Mac’s
accounting history and the multiple federal investigations now facing the company).
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Most observers frame the problem in terms of a professional’s
failure to perform a duty to a client. Under this view, diminished
confidence in audit quality caused stock price declines and turned
shareholders into the victims of a classic principal-agent conflict of
interest. The auditors disserved the shareholder interest they are
charged to protect by pursing lucrative consulting contracts with their
audit clients, thus compromising their independence, and hence, their
professional integrity. Management, violating its own duties to the
shareholders, crossed the auditors’ palms with silver in exchange for a
10
free hand to manage bottom-line numbers. This dirty deal between
managers and auditors follows from the 1990s shift to stock option
compensation, which skews management’s incentives toward stock
market speculation.11 The solution to the problem is thought to lie in
redirecting the auditor-agent’s loyalty to the shareholder principal. In
the words of Arthur Levitt:
Independence, at its most basic level, is exercised and honored by
those professionals who must abide by it, and assumed by those who
must rely on it. It is a covenant between auditor and investor, and no
one else; a covenant that says the auditor works in the interests of
12
shareholders, not on behalf of management . . . .

The principal-agent characterization resonates especially well in
both corporate law and economics, because it cabins the problem of
auditor responsibility within these fields’ paradigms for describing
and regulating duties within the firm. The legal paradigm is the
13
framework of fiduciary duty, which regulates conflicts of interest and
accords shareholder value enhancement a privileged place amongst

10. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic History
of the 1990’s 8–13, 26–28 (Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies,
Working Paper No. 214, 2003), at http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/
wp_listing_1/wp_listing/211-220#6984 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing
management’s preferences for managed earnings in the 1990s and the rise of nonaudit service
provision by auditors).
11. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection:
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1146–47 (2003) (“[T]he
ramping up of executive compensation with generous stock options made CEO’s and CFO’s
obsessed with high stock prices, which they were willing to inflate by hook or by crook.”).
12. Levitt, supra note 3.
13. For a discussion of management’s duty to report accurately in the corporate fiduciary
law framework, see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking
Corporate Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 507–18
(2000).
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14
the firm’s objectives. The economic paradigm is agency theory,
which looks at conflicts of interest as problems of misaligned agent
15
incentives and seeks corrective adjustments.
This Article questions the practice of framing the problem of
auditors’ professional responsibility inside the principal-agent
16
paradigm, even as it accepts the story of the dirty deal. The
questions about the agency framework follow from an inquiry into
the operative notion of the shareholder beneficiary. The Article
unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a particularized story
about the shareholder interest. The exercise complicates the agency
description, which tends to assume a unitary model of the
shareholder. Under this Article’s analysis, multiple and unstable
shareholder demands displace the unitary shareholder interest. This
fragmented and volatile model of the shareholder does not provide a
basis for articulating a coherent set of instructions respecting
aggressive accounting and earnings management.
This Article endorses traditional notions of auditor
independence even as it rejects the principal-agent paradigm and the
fiduciary-beneficiary framework that accompanies it. To see the
connection, let us return to Arthur Levitt and complete his sentence:

It is a covenant between auditor and investor . . . that says the
auditor works in the interests of shareholders . . . a covenant that
says the auditor must steer clear of having financial interests in the

14.
15.

The touchstone citation is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 9–11, 14–15 (1991). For descriptions of auditors and auditor independence in
an agency theoretical framework, see Rick Antle, Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 1
(1984) (modeling the independence problem in terms of agency theory and focusing on auditor
compensation schemes) and Rick Antle, The Auditor as an Economic Agent, 20 J. ACCT. RES.
503 (1982) (addressing “issues which arise when an auditor is explicitly introduced in a
principal-agent framework”).
16. In addition to the headlines that triggered the crisis, the dirty deal story is well
supported by academic studies showing a negative correlation between earnings quality and
auditor provision of nonaudit services. See Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation Between
Auditors’ Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Management 2–3, 19–25 (MIT Sloan School,
Working Paper No. 4330-02, 2002) (showing a positive association between earnings
management and nonaudit fees); see also Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou et al., Corporate
Governance and Earnings Management 20–26 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (showing a negative correlation between earnings management and
audit committee independence); April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director
Characteristics, and Earnings Management 22 (Oct. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (demonstrating a negative correlation between earnings management
and audit committee independence but no additional benefits from complete independence).
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companies he or she audits; and a covenant that says the auditor’s
17
work stands separate and apart from their clients’ business.

The second part of Levitt’s sentence sets out the traditional view,
defining auditor independence in terms of a financial interest
18
separate from the shareholders. Unfortunately for Levitt’s covenant,
the traditional view and the framework of agency fiduciary duty do
not blend into a coherent whole. One cannot “stand separate and
apart” from the client’s business and at the same time be an agent
beholden to the shareholder interest. If we want auditors to be
independent, we cannot mesh them in an agency relationship with the
shareholders, where by definition they become subject to the
principal’s control19 and cannot act independently. Nor, for the same
reason, should auditors’ duties be articulated in the framework of
corporate law fiduciary duty. More generally, auditor responsibility
should not be conceived relationally at all.
But if not an agency relationship, then what? This Article
concludes that legal positivism provides a more appropriate
conceptual framework. Auditor duties should be conceived in formal
rather than relational terms, with fidelity going to the rules, to the
texts, and to the system that auditors apply. An auditor faithful to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the elaborate
system of rules and standards that determines accounting
20
treatments, will be better equipped to serve its clients’ interest than

17. Levitt, supra note 3.
18. To avoid financial stakes is to adhere to the basic rules of auditor independence as
embedded in SEC rules dating back to 1972. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b)–(c) (2003) (prohibiting
auditors from holding client stock).
19. “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf
and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to
act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
20. GAAP has two leading sources, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). FASB, a nongovernmental organization,
is accounting’s legislature. MICHAEL A. DIAMOND ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING:
REPORTING AND ANALYSIS 12 (5th ed. 2000). But the SEC has the authority to trump FASB’s
treatments and impose its own treatments. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(a), 78m(b)(1) (2000) (granting
the SEC the power to prescribe accounting forms, details, and measures). The SEC rarely uses
this authority, preferring to work cooperatively with FASB when it wants GAAP revised.
DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 146 (3d ed. 2001).
GAAP is mandatory for companies filing reports under the federal securities laws. See
Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg.
10,913 (Sept. 27, 1946) (considering those accounting statements prepared under principles not
enjoying substantial authoritative support misleading).
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an auditor catering to transient client demands, particularly the
21
demand to maximize shareholder value.
Part I describes finance as a world of political tension. The
tension results from the fact that the present value of a share cannot
be verified as fundamental value. Under this uncertainty, equity
investors fragment into diverse types—speculators, investors, shortterm holders, long-term holders, noise traders, fundamental value
investors, dumb money, and smart money. Part I sets out a taxonomy
of shareholders that divides the various types along a left-wing—
right-wing political axis, with speculative, noisy shareholders on the
left and conservative shareholders on the right.
Part II shows that the right-side, conservative shareholder
interest tends to object to aggressive accounting, while the
speculative, noisy, left-side interest takes a more equivocal view. The
left accepts and approves of aggressive accounting practices on an
upside price cycle, only to be at risk of injury when the cycle turns
down. Aggressive accounting suited left-side shareholders particularly
well during the recent period of irrational exuberance. Even as
economic fundamentals ceased to contain share prices and
22
conservative voices in the financial world rose in warning, left-side
shareholders paid no attention.23 Auditors helped confirm the
optimistic picture by allowing aggressive accounting, serving the leftside shareholder interest even as audit quality deteriorated.
Unfortunately for auditors, shareholder demand is a dynamic feature
of the financial landscape. It shifts quickly from exuberance to
conservatism when the market index points down. Thus, shareholder
demand has shifted across the board to accounting conservatism in
21. To reject agency in favor of a positive approach to auditor duties also is to reject
application of the shareholder value maximization norm. This Article accordingly joins the body
of opinion that accounts for the crisis of confidence by looking to the pathologies of the bubble
stock market, as well as to the agent incentive problems bound up in the dirty deal. See, e.g.,
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 767, 786–836 (2002) (discussing shareholder empowerment in light of insights into
behavioral economics); Coffee, supra note 10, at 4–7 (arguing that we should look both to
changes in management incentives and the special incentive problems connected to the bubble
stock market). Such an account still starts with stock option compensation and its creation of the
perverse incentive to maintain the stock price by misstating results. But the skewed incentive
structure of the 1990s does not have sufficiently recent origins to make for a complete account.
The bubble stock market fills out the story, implying that the shareholders themselves share the
blame if not the responsibility.
22. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 203–33 (2000) (assessing,
correctly, that the market was grossly overvalued and surveying possible responses).
23. Money on the table tends to have that effect.
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the last two years. But this neoconservatism remains contingent on
market events. For the long term, we cannot project an enduring
right-left shareholder coalition for conservative accounting.
Part III asks whether we plausibly can articulate auditor duties
for the benefit of a shareholder beneficiary modeled from the
conservative side. This analysis does yield a signal against aggressive
treatments, but a clear set of instructions remains elusive. Conflicts
with investor protection policies also arise. And even if we arrived on
a set of conservative instructions, they would have to be imposed by
regulation. Conservative auditing firms will not evolve by
spontaneous order. Left to their own devices, managers will always
prefer to keep their options open and engage an auditor with a
reputation for flexibility.
Part IV concludes that auditors should be instructed to look for
guidance from their own jurisprudence of GAAP rather than from
their shareholder clients. A shift to this positivist concept of auditor
responsibility will not by itself solve the crisis of confidence. But it
will provide a superior framework within which to evaluate
24
accounting treatments and professional reforms. Shareholder
capitalism, like freedom, should be limited for the sake of its own
preservation.
I. FINANCE AS POLITICS
Lawyers and economists both tend to model a unitary
shareholder whose preferences are constant in time. This simplified
actor takes business risks, wants value maximized, and holds its stock
for an indeterminate period. This actor also suffers an informational
disadvantage relative to managers and depends on the managers for
information, even as this actor possesses meaningful self-protective
options such as diversifying, monitoring, and selling into the liquid
market. Theorists do not disagree about the general components of
the model. Rather, differences emerge only as to the relative
emphasis that should be given to each component, particularly as

24. The incentive problem bound up in the fact that the client’s managers pay the fee
assures the persistence of independence problems. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Inevitability of
Enron and the Impossibility of “Auditor Independence” Under the Current Audit System 50
(Mar. 1, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[T]he
fundamental tension in the statutory audit system is that auditors get hired by, fired by, and
must work side by side with, the corporate client . . . while legally required to take the interests
of shareholders, creditors, and the public as their primary responsibility and allegiance.”).
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between the shareholder’s dependent and self-protective aspects.
When subsets of shareholders are broken out, there tend to be only
26
two—individual and institutional holders.
Simplicity has its advantages, and the unitary model works well
much of the time. Occasionally, however the model obscures the issue
on the table, as has happened with the present crisis respecting
financial reports. Here, one needs to unpack the model and look
through to the real world to see that there is no unitary, empirical
shareholder whose preferences provide a basis for deducing a set of
instructions about accounting treatments. Constructing a model
shareholder beneficiary in this context means choosing among
different types of shareholders. This choice is a political decision. Just
as politics informs a legislative judgment when conflicting interest
groups compete for regulation, politics informs the choice of
27
instructions respecting a system of financial reporting. Given
shareholders with different preferences and expectations, such
choices cannot be avoided. This is financial politics, not public
politics, but it is still politics.
Section A shows that shareholding’s political contingency follows
from uncertainty about value. People buy, sell, and hold shares in
pursuit of value. But, at any given moment and whatever the stock
price, no one can be sure whether or to what extent value really
exists. The shareholder profile as a result becomes variegated by
different approaches to valuation and behavioral infirmities.
Meanwhile, in a world of uncertain valuation, the one thing that is
supposed to be clear and verifiable is the record of past performance.
But clarity and verifiability are not so easily achieved even as to the
past record. No science holds out an objectively correct means to
record and report corporate transactions. Accounting principles, like

25. Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15, at 28–30 (insisting that
shareholders look for aggregate gains and can self-protect through diversification), with
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 185–
91, 202–09 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (stressing that shareholders invest because of trust,
which has social value that is enhanced through fiduciary law).
26. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
525, 578–80, 585–89 (1990) (suggesting that shareholder passivity is historically contingent,
incentives to intervene will change with aggregation of holdings in institutional hands, and that
regulatory barriers to larger holdings should be removed); Harry DeAngelo et al., Special
Dividends and the Evolution of Dividend Signaling, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 350–51 (2000)
(suggesting that a shift in holding pattern from individual stockholders to institutional holders
explains changes in payout policy that occurred between 1962 and 1995).
27. For a similar use of a political analogy, see SHILLER, supra note 22, at 233.
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all laws, follow from their drafters’ policy judgments, and reporting
firms must make judgment calls in applying them. It follows that the
accounting system and the audit take center stage in the politics of
shareholding.
A. The Elusive Value of a Share
Finance is political because, at any given time, no one knows
exactly how much a given share is worth. To see this, one need only
refer to the simplest expression of investment value:
PV = A
r

Present value (PV) equals cash flow over time (A) divided by a
discount or capitalization rate (r). PV is today’s stock price. A is the
checks the investor expects to get in the mail with respect to the
investment. The capitalization rate r is the rate of return on the
investment.28 Most of equity valuation is an expansion of this
29
relationship.
The fact that value can be expressed as an equation misleads
people into thinking that the exercise of valuation, done with the
correct methodology, yields a correct result—a PV that equals the
intrinsic value of the stock. In fact, there is no such empirical result.
There are only guesses. The reason is this: Investing entails parting
with cash today with the hope of a larger cash payment to be made in
the future. But, because no one knows what the future will bring, the
30
A in the equation is just a projection, a guesstimate. The more one
knows about the investment, the better the guess. For investments in
stable firms with established shares of quiet product markets, one can
get a good handle on the future by reference to past performance.31
But the number of informational variables is endless even in this

28. For a more detailed presentation of valuation fundamentals, including the constant
growth variation on the equation, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 62–71 (6th ed. 2000).
29. For an example of the analytical expansion on the basic equation into a series of
valuation models, see ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 532–56 (4th ed. 2000). Balance sheet
valuation models are the exception to the rule.
30. See id. at 557 (noting that uncertainty respecting stock market forecasts is always high).
31. BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 437
(4th ed. 1962). Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense when Financial Markets Are (Only)
Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 793–94 (2003), suggests that, as a result, the
gravamen of uncertainty in valuation lies in the ascertainment of the capitalization rate.
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relatively easy case, because we are talking not only about the future
32
of one company producing in a competitive market, but the future of
the economy as a whole.
Constant uncertainty about value causes inconsistencies and
33
anomalies to creep into investors’ behavior. The reader of Business
Week who peruses growth projections for the economy, projections
generated by financial institutions or consultants, would be unlikely
to lay money on their accuracy. Yet when the same reader buys a
stock, she puts her money down on a projection of a stream of cash
flow that bears a close familial relation. In fact, to the extent the
Business Week prognosticators project only for the near or an
intermediate term, the projection bound up in a stock purchase is
even less certain because it involves a prediction of the indefinite
future.34
35
The discount rate r also is a guess. In theory, it reflects
36
sensitivity to risk and is subjective to the investor. Because people
are risk averse, as A gets chancier, the discount rate r gets bigger,
causing the present value to decrease: The higher the risk, the higher
the r, and the higher the rate of return.37 The discount rate’s
subjective origins imply empirical grounding.38 But, to the extent they

32. See ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 260 (2000) (describing the firmspecific risks of a simple baking business).
33. See SHILLER, supra note 22, at 55–57 (describing emotional bases of investor behavior
under uncertainty).
34. PV=A/r values the firm as a perpetuity. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 66. The
assumption seems heroic. Under one approach to valuation practice there is no point in
projecting specific payments beyond an intermediate term of around five years. See EUGENE F.
BRIGHAM & LOUIS C. GAPENSKI, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 241–46
(6th ed. 1991) (“Firms typically go through life cycles.”).
35. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 66–69, for an exposition of this point, using
dividend yield on a relatively stable stock as a proxy for r, but concluding that for any stock a
present estimate of r is too error-prone and subject to noise to be meaningful.
36. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 29, at 150–55 (describing the behavioral origins of
investor risk aversion).
37. See id. at 127–40 (describing the relationship between risk and return). It follows that
high returns on equity investments imply significant risk taking. It also follows that people who
make killings in the market are not necessarily smart. Cf. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A
SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA 78–79 (1990) (noting the “public impression that
intelligence, one’s own and that of others, marches in close step with the possession of money”).
They may merely be lucky, proceeding on greed and killer instinct more than on analytical
prowess.
38. Financial economics’ “separation theorem” limits the subjective moment in investment
to the selection of a proportion of riskless treasury securities to be mixed with investment in the
market equity portfolio. But it achieves this limitation on subjectivity only on the heroic
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exist at all, subjective capitalization rates do not reveal themselves in
practice. There is no way to know operative values of r for a stock
39
based on yesterday’s closing price. There are too many variables.
Market results for defined periods in the past can be analyzed so as to
produce empirical rates of return for those defined past periods.40 But
the verifiable numbers of the past are only so much help in valuation.
Investment looks to the future, not the past. Nor can of the market
prices of comparable firms bring certainty to the uncertain world of
share valuation. Comparable numbers are verifiable, but they derive
from real world transactions made by other actors making guesses.
Such information assists the actor under uncertainty,41 but the
exercise of assaying comparables does not yield figures that
determine a company’s “intrinsic” or “fundamental” value—the
“true” value of the firm.
Despite all the foregoing, the concept of fundamental value is far
from meaningless. Indeed, it is valuation’s constant focal point.
Although the accuracy of a price set today cannot be verified or
falsified, it is verified or falsified over time; the truth wills out over
42
time in cold hard cash.
Finally, even though investment and valuation look to the
unknowable future, past results bear critically on valuation. They

assumption investors can borrow to purchase risky stocks at the risk free rate of return. JAMES
H. LORIE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 122–26 (2d ed. 1985).
39. See supra note 35. Empirical values of r can be ascertained for bonds because the
projected payment stream is fixed, and thus the only variables are default and inflation risk. As
these risks increase, the value of r in the equation rises; the value of r also being the yield on the
bonds. One can derive that figure easily if you know the promised payment and the present
market price. In fact, the Wall Street Journal does the derivation daily. See BODIE ET AL., supra
note 29, at 401–05 (showing reported bond yields). With equities, the value of A is not fixed and
follows from the success or failure of the company. The result is that the present values reported
in the press do not communicate the discount rates brought to bear by the actors parting with
their money to buy the stock. A price earnings ratio, inter alia, provides an indirect handle on
market discount rates, but an often unreliable one. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE
FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 72–73 (5th ed. 2002) (“[S]ince the market is engaged in
capitalizing future (not past or even solely current earnings), the capitalization rate cannot be
observed directly or determined precisely.”).
40. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 29, at 571–72, for a simple model in which empirical
returns on selected stocks are regressed against those of a wider market index for a discrete
period in the past.
41. See BODIE & MERTON, supra note 32, at 208–09 (2000) (suggesting that the “essence”
of valuation lies in reference to comparable assets with known market prices, but admitting that
analysts search for and can discover incorrectly valued assets in trading markets).
42. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 29, at 537 (asserting that price and intrinsic value
converge over time).
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provide a base point for future projections and, more generally,
amount to all one can know for certain in an uncertain situation. The
auditor enters at this point in the description: By protecting the
integrity of the past numbers, the auditor protects the integrity of the
43
entire valuation process. The audit looms large even though A is a
projection of a cash flow figure rather than a projection of an income
44
statement bottom line to be passed on by an auditor. Analysts derive
A by making standard adjustments to a present income statement
45
figure and then projecting into the future. It follows that equity
valuation tends to rely on audited figures, assuming them to be both
empirically verifiable and duly verified.46 It further follows that if the
income statement figure cannot be trusted, the whole valuation is
tainted from the start. The very suggestion of a taint means an
increase in the value of r.47 So when the post-Enron market woke up
on January 29, 2002 concerned that bad accounting and auditing were
48
widespread problems, it adjusted its values of r upward because it
suddenly lost confidence in the values of A on which it based its
49
projections. Present prices fell as a result. In the world of finance—
where risks that cause prices to fall normally concern badly run
operations or bad economies and valuations assume sound reporting
institutions—that sudden, added uncertainty implies a crisis.

43. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 227–28 (discussing investor perceptions of
audits as guarantees of accuracy and the reality that audits at best provide a reasonable
assurance of the absence of material misstatements).
44. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 29, at 575 (discussing the importance of the net income
figure); BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 72–77 (discussing the link between the stock
price and earnings per share).
45. See BRATTON, supra note 39, at 45–49 (making the adjustments).
46. There is an extensive empirical literature demonstrating the relevance of accounting
results for valuation. For a review of the literature, see Robert W. Holthausen & Ross. L. Watts,
The Relevance of the Value-Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting, 31 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5–14 (2001).
47. The GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 24, notes an average stock price decline of 10
percent on the trading day after the announcement of an accounting restatement. Some of these
losses could reflect downward adjustments of A. Increases in r also will have figured in since a
restatement taints the quality of the issuer’s entire reporting system.
48. See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
49. See Dan A. Simunic, Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES.
679, 680 & n.2, 699 (1984) (suggesting that investors will require compensation for a perceived
increase in the probability of inaccurate reporting, causing the firms market value to decline);
Siew Hong Teoh & T.J. Wong, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings Response, 68 ACCT.
REV. 346, 347–49, 364–65 (1993) (showing that perceived reductions in audit quality trigger
stock price declines due to downward revision of expected earnings).
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B. Modeling the Shareholder
To value a share is to get a handle on A and r, studying facts
presently ascertainable about the company, the industry, and the
economy, and then to take out a crystal ball. Because security prices
are only projections, it comes as no surprise that financial economics
has never managed to come up with a robust asset pricing model.50
Absent such a model, which would provide a means to verify present
prices, there is much room for behavioral variation and diversity of
approach and opinion in the world of shareholding. And so the world
of finance is as much a world of politics and politicians as it is a world
of technologies and technocrats.
The eight-part typology in Table 1 captures the diverse
approaches and behaviors that politicize shareholding. The eight
classifications are presented as a series of opposite pairs so as to
clarify the political description; there results a series of four binary
51
alternatives for a model shareholder.
TABLE 1
Left Side
Speculation
Noise trading
Dumb money
Short term

Right Side
(Financial Conservatism)
Investment
Fundamental value investment
Smart money
Long term

To model a unitary shareholder beneficiary in order to derive a
set of coherent governance instructions is to mix and match

50. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information,
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 771–72 (1985) (explaining why market prices
cannot be proven to be allocatively efficient). Application of the leading model of asset pricing,
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, cannot yield a verifiable intrinsic value because the model is
based on past results. See BRATTON, supra note 39, at 109–11 (discussing the derivation of the
variables and controversies respecting empirical tests).
51. For a contrasting binary, see Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68
BROOKLYN L. REV. 407, 409–20 (2002). On the left side, Stout places the trusting investor, and
on the right side, she places the rational expectations investor. Many elements of Stout’s
description overlap elements in the description here. But the two discussions have diverging
normative implications. Stout’s trusting investor is a victim, to whose needs the securities
markets should cater, inter alia, by abandoning conservative, verifiable accounting. Id. at 433–
34, 434 n.71.

BRATTON.DOC

2003]

06/21/04 3:58 PM

SHAREHOLDER VALUE

453

characteristics from the various rows and from either column. But a
problem arises. If one includes too many characteristics from both
columns at once, the model loses its coherence. To maintain a viable
shareholder unit and a basis from which to deduce regulation, one
must choose sides.
The observation that coherent shareholder models follow from
reductive choices does not necessarily carry negative normative
implications. Nor should it be taken to assert that reductive modeling
is necessary in all governance contexts. The shareholder is modeled
routinely in boardrooms and in corporate and securities law. The
menu selections and the model’s particulars vary with the context.
For example, in the 1990s stock market, actual investor behavior
52
followed extensively from the left column. Historically, securities
53
law regulates from the perspective of the right column. But leftcolumn considerations have been creeping in noticeably during the
last two decades.54 Corporate law tends toward generality, modeling
the shareholder beneficiary so vaguely as to elide the problem of
making menu choices. This is not necessarily a failing. The
governance problems on corporate law’s table often do not require
further inquiry into the shareholders’ financial and behavioral
profiles. For example, when the question is whether management
should be able to line its pocket with an unfair self-dealing
transaction, the law fairly may assume a universal shareholder
interest in a fiduciary duty of loyalty.55 Notably, corporate law draws
selectively and opportunistically from the right column in articulating
52. See SHILLER, supra note 22 (describing the causes of the 1990s stock market bubble).
53. The federal securities laws mandate disclosure of fundamental information under
penalty of law on the assumption that management operating in a free marketplace will have
inadequate incentives so to do. See 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 169–93 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the competing philosophies that underlie
disclosure law). One benefit is diminished volatility in stock prices. Id. at 216–19.
54. The turning point occurred in 1978. Prior thereto, the SEC insisted that issuers disclose
only verifiable financial information. That conservative position was much criticized. See, e.g.,
Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1151, 1188–91 (1970) (arguing that accountings should incorporate the values of assets rather
than their costs). The SEC eventually yielded, crafting a safe harbor rule for issuer disclosures
of projections, Securities Act Release No. 5993, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 81,757 (Nov. 7, 1978), as well as setting guidelines for projections of future performance,
Securities Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,756
(Nov. 7, 1978).
55. In the historic legal model of the corporation, the fiduciaries—board of the directors
and officers—owe their duty not to the shareholders directly but to the corporate entity. The
classic citation is People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911). By using the
entity notion, the law in effect models a unitary shareholder.
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the law of takeover defense. This controversial fiduciary construct
aligns the “long-term” shareholder with the manager against left-side
57
actors so as to justify management takeover defenses.
The columns’ left-right organization designedly shadows the left58
right split of public politics since the French Revolution. There is
some difficulty, however, in designating the two columns. The term
“financial conservative,” implied by the left-right split, fairly can be
applied to right-side shareholders.59 But neither “liberal” nor
“progressive” makes sense for the left side. “Aggressive” works
better, but not well enough, for there are plenty of aggressive
investors on the right side. The phrases “shareholder value
maximization” and “shareholder capitalism” described many actors
and events on the left side during the 1990s. Unfortunately, these
phrases fail descriptively because just about everybody in both
columns wants shareholder value maximized.60 The 1960s term “go
go” works well for the left side some of the time, as does Alan
61
Greenspan’s 1996 phrase “irrational exuberance.” In bear markets,
however, left-side investors are anything but go go or enthusiastic.
“Easy money” also describes the left side, although only on the
upside. So this Article will proceed referring to “left-side” and “rightside” shareholders, substituting the conservative label for the right
side on occasion.
There follows a description of the eight types of shareholders and
the political tensions that distinguish them.
56. Compare Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 973 (2002) (articulating a shareholder choice model), with Martin Lipton, Pills,
Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002) (arguing for management
discretion respecting takeover defense to protect the long-term interest).
57. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
(approving defensive tender offer on the ground of protection of long-term investment plan).
58. The practice of denoting political opinions by left and right dates from the early
meetings of the French National Assembly, at which the former third estate sat to the left of the
chair and the former privileged classes sat to the right. WILLIAM JAMES MURRAY, THE RIGHTWING PRESS IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: 1789–92, 3 (1986).
59. In the interest of full disclosure, the author admits to adherence to financial
conservative values in scholarship and teaching and also in the conduct of personal affairs.
60. On a rational actor model, the only equity investors who would not want common stock
value maximized have additional claims against the firm in other forms, as employees, creditors,
or preferred stockholders. Issues arise concerning maximization of the firm’s overall value for
the benefit of these constituents and maximization of the value of the common stock. The
leading intervention in favor of overall maximization is Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm
for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214
(1999).
61. SHILLER, supra note 22, at 3.
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1. Speculation versus Investment. The first binary comes from
the classic conservative treatise on finance and valuation, Graham
62
Graham and Dodd divide
and Dodd’s Security Analysis.
stockholders into two types. On the left side, they place those who
play the market looking for quick upsides—speculators. They
contrast speculators with investors, dividing investors into two
subsets. In their more conservative appearance, right-side investors
look for safe income streams, analyzing past performance and
avoiding any forward-looking projection. The less conservative subset
of right-side investors looks for capital appreciation rather than
income, investing in future growth projections. They thereby
resemble speculators, the difference lying in the approach taken.
Investment in growth requires something “more tangible than the
psychology of the purchaser.”63 Specifically, it requires, as objectives,
safety of principal and a satisfactory return, and, as means to the
objectives’ fulfillment, thorough analysis. Such analysis has to address
the quality of the company, but cannot stop there. Quantity, in the
sense of the relation of the stock price to the company’s fundamental
value, matters just as much. In the Graham and Dodd picture, the
market price is not necessarily the best available evidence of the
value being offered. Given a market full of speculators, it certainly
will not be: the highest quality firm is just a speculative issue if
speculators have bid its price to the stratosphere.64 Meanwhile, say
Graham and Dodd, investment is “good for everybody and at all
65
times.”
2. Noise Trading versus Fundamental Value Investment.
Graham and Dodd’s distinction between speculation and investment

62. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUE 33–36 (3d ed. 1951). There is nothing in the discussion that follows here that cannot
be found, expressly or by implication, in Graham and Dodd’s chapter 4. For a contemporary
discussion of speculation, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas:
Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001).
63. GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 62, at 37.
64. Id. at 38–39. Contemporary observers term their approach “value investing.” Warren
Buffett, a Graham student, is a famously successful exemplar. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN,
BUFFETT: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN CAPITALIST 36–59 (1995) (describing Buffett’s
relationship with Graham).
65. GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 62, at 34. But speculation is not always bad, depending
on who does the speculating and the prevailing conditions. Unfortunately, speculation often
turns out badly: The failure properly to distinguish between the two activities, they say, brought
about the disaster of 1929. Id.
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can be updated with reference to the contemporary noise trading
66
theory of stock market pricing. The noise theorists occupy the
branch of financial economics that allows itself to be influenced by
67
behavioral psychology. The traders they describe resemble Graham
and Dodd’s speculators. For their right-side counterparts, we can
update Graham and Dodd to model a contemporary class of
“fundamental value investors.”68 These actors have assimilated the
lessons of valuation described above. They know that value lies in
hard cash flows and they invest into those flows even as they look for
growth. Their time perspectives tend to be longer. And their
information sets only include facts respecting the investee and the
economy—so called “fundamental value information,” rather than
the latest word from Wall Street. Market trends and daily noise do
not impress them.
The noise traders resemble Graham and Dodd’s speculators,
with an overlay of psychology to thicken the description of the
speculative mindset. Noise traders chase trends: When they see
somebody make a killing on a rising stock, they assume that actor to
69
70
be smart rather than lucky and imitate the strategy. They also
display behavioral biases; they are overconfident in their own
71
investment abilities. When the stock price is trending up, they react
too favorably to good news. Once a down trend has asserted itself
they react too unfavorably to bad news. In both cases they suffer from
66. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 19–20, 25–30 (reviewing “an alternative to the
efficient markets approach . . . recently pursued”).
67. See BRATTON, supra note 39, at 159.
68. Noise theorists sometimes model value investors but also employ the smart/dumb
distinction. See infra text accompanying notes 83–92. For a leading model employing the noise
versus value investor distinction, see Josef Lakonishok et al., Contrarian Investment,
Extrapolation, and Risk, 49 J. FIN. 1541, 1542–44, 1575–76 (1994). This model divides
shareholders into value investors and growth investors, and suggests that investors seeking an
above-market yield should select “value” stocks because most investors make the mistake of
selecting “glamour” stocks. Glamour stock investors suffer from a cognitive limitation: they
overreact optimistically to the recent history of good news about those stocks, paying too much
on the assumption that past earnings growth can be extrapolated into the indefinite future. At
the same time, they overreact in the negative to the stocks of firms that have suffered recent
reverses. Institutional investors make the same mistake, confusing investment in stocks with
outstanding performance records in recent periods with “prudent” investment.
69. See GALBRAITH, supra note 37, at 12–13 (describing the “specious association of
money and intelligence” that characterizes investor behavior).
70. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 66, at 28–30 (describing positive feedback trading).
71. Robert A. Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1459–60 (2002).

BRATTON.DOC

2003]

06/21/04 3:58 PM

SHAREHOLDER VALUE

457

the availability bias, placing too great a weight on recent events and
72
easily available information. Availability bias also leads investors to
make ill-considered risk-return projections, underweighting the
importance of risks of low probability and high magnitude. Finally, at
the moment when the trend turns, noise traders can be a little slow to
73
read the handwriting on the wall. This cognitive dissonance follows
from hindsight bias—overweighting past events that actually occurred
rather than those that might have occurred.74 It also follows from
confirmation bias—the tendency to confirm earlier decisions
75
regardless of their intrinsic soundness: Noise traders get embedded
notions about their strategies and shut out information. The list goes
76
on.
Trends dominate the resulting picture of market pricing.77 When
the market trends up, too much is made of good news and bad news is
78
filtered out. Indeed, market information may influence the price as
much as, or even more than, fundamental value information. This
happens in a bubble, when a feedback loop takes over as one stock
price increase feeds the next increase.79 The trend only turns some
time after information about fundamental value has ceased to justify

72. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127–28 (1974) (describing availability biases that arise when “people
assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind”).
73. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627,
659–61 (1996) (describing how brokers can disguise bad investment advice, causing investors to
make decisions at a slower pace).
74. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION &
PERFORMANCE 288, 297 (1975) (“Finding out that an outcome has occurred increases its
perceived likelihood. . . . Thus, Judges tend to believe that this relative inevitability was largely
apparent in foresight, without the benefit of knowledge what happened.”).
75. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL.
2098, 2099, 2108 (1979) (“[T]here is considerable evidence that people tend to interpret
subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs.”).
76. See generally Cunningham, supra note 21, at 780–86 (surveying the field); Langevoort,
supra note 73, at 634–41 (describing behavioral distortions that lead to excessive risk taking).
77. For models, see, e.g., Nicholas C. Barberis et al., A Model of Investor Sentiment, 49 J.
FIN. ECON. 307, 318–32 (1998); Kent D. Daniel et al., Investor Psychology and Security Market
Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. FIN. 1839, 1845–55 (1998).
78. See Barberis et al., supra note 77, at 310–13 (summarizing evidence of price
underreaction to good news and momentum in stock prices).
79. SHILLER, supra note 22, at 44–68.
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80
the price. Eventually the accumulation of bad news causes investors
to substitute a new, negative model.81 Then the trend turns downward,
82
with investors thereafter tending to underweight good news.
Restating in less formal terms, swings of mood characterize the
behavior of left-side investors. We have seen of late that the mood
swings can be quite extreme. Uncertainty is the ultimate cause.

3. Dumb Money Versus Smart Money. The next binary, dumb
money versus smart money, complicates the division between noise
traders and fundamental value investors. The dumb money includes
the noise traders, but could also include a fundamental value investor
who still has a lot to learn and who does something really ill-advised,
like investing based on the recommendation of a stockbroker. The
smart money similarly includes the better-informed fundamental
value investors, but the category should encompass other actors as
well. Graham and Dodd find practical utility in a distinction between
“unintelligent speculation” and “intelligent speculation”—the
difference between uninformed risk-taking and risk-taking upon
study and consideration.83 Making reference to the noise trading
model, we can update the “intelligent speculator” into the smart
money investor. Some smart money will combine fundamental and
market value information, watching the noise traders and the market
trend. When the noise traders go on an upside tear, bidding up stocks
in a feedback loop where an uptick is good news that triggers another
uptick, smart money certainly can ride along. There is, after all,
money to be made as prices rise. But the smart money knows when
fundamentals do not support the market price and, being (relatively)
free of behavioral biases, will be the first to bail out when the trend
turns. The same insights invite the smart money to profit by bucking
the trend. When fundamental value does not support the market
price, the price inevitably will fall. Accordingly, money can be made
shorting the stock (or the whole market) or buying puts. Either way,

80. See Barberis et al., supra note 77, at 307–08 (describing how over one to twelve-month
periods “security prices underreact to news”).
81. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 113–14 (2000); Lakonishok et al., supra note 68, at 1542.
82. SHLEIFER, supra note 81, at 113–14. “[O]ut-of-favor (or value) stocks have been
underpriced relative to their risk and return characteristics, and investing in them has indeed
earned abnormal returns.” Lakonishok et al., supra note 68, at 1574.
83. GRAHAM & DODD, supra note 62, at 43.
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the smart money bets that the stock (or the market) will fall. More
generally, given a lot of noise, smart money is likely to be contrarian.
In this contrarian posture, the smart money plays the most heroic
role in all of financial economics. The second branch of the field—the
orthodox one that averts its eyes from behavioral psychology—
adheres to the famous efficient market hypothesis (EMH). The EMH
asserts that the market price is the best reflection of fundamental
value and that new fundamental value information gets into the stock
84
price almost immediately. The EMH asserts these points even as it
accepts the existence of dumb money and noise trading.85 It is able to
do both at once because it asserts that smart money trumps dumb
money. Dumb money goes off in every direction, canceling itself out
in the random error term. Smart money goes consistently in the
direction of fundamental value, keeping stock prices correctly aligned
with fundamentals.86
The EMH remains a good story,87 but the contrasting noise
trading description of the market became ascendant at some point
during the last decade. Recent stock market behavior confirms the
shift. Under the present consensus view, the stock market is a place
where noisy supply and demand intermix with fundamental value
because there is not enough smart money to trump the dumb money
88
in the short term. Contrarian investment is just too risky. In the long
term, however, fundamental value always prevails.
Indeed, fundamental value information remains highly relevant
even in a bubble stock market. A rational, fundamental value story

84. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at 354–62.
85. SHLEIFER, supra note 81, at 2–3.
86. Id. Under the EMH it follows that supply and demand do not determine stock prices.
What is an offer in the stock market is money in the future and the demand for money is
consistently high. The valuation questions go only to the amount of money, the time of
payment, and the quantum of risk—questions answered by fundamental value information.
Since demand is a constant, the only thing that can cause a price to change is new fundamental
value information. Noise traders, meanwhile, always get wiped out in the long run. Id. at 3–5.
87. For a recent defense of the story, see Eugene F. Fama, Market Efficiency, Long Term
Returns, and Behavioral Finance, 49 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 285–88 (1998).
88. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35,
49–54 (1997) (“[A]rbitrage opportunities are harder to identify in stock markets than in bond
and foreign exchange markets.”). It is argued that the introduction of single stock futures
contracts will make it less costly to take contrarian positions, permitting the smart money to do
the price corrective job hypothesized in the EMH. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative
Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 743 (2002) (“[U]nless regulators
gum up the works, [investors] should be able to go short in future markets by posting cash
margin, but without the need to borrow shares.”). Time will tell.
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supported the noisiest of recent markets—the dot-com bubble of the
late 1990s. The Internet was new, people were shifting their attention
to it in large numbers, and the number of customers was expected to
increase. According to the story, that meant there were going to be
fantastic profits for a handful of winners who got in early with
89
attractive websites and gained market share. Without such a
fundamental value story there would have been no dot-com boom.
The problem was that the story, although rational, was also highly
probabilistic. Worse, it became exaggerated in the telling, in the
interpretation, and in the wake of actual stock price increases. When
the market puts present money on the table, the connection between
that market value and the supporting fundamental value story can be
very attenuated.90 But even at the crest of tulipmania, there was an
operative fundamental value story.91
All of this implies that for a stockholder, whether a noise trader
or a fundamental value investor, nothing is more important than news
about fundamental value. Of all fundamental value information,
earnings information is the most important subset: PV = A/r. Every
time new earnings reports appear, people adjust their projections of
92
A to account for the news. Adjustment occurs whether the investor
is smart or dumb, or trades on noise or fundamental value. The
protection of the integrity of this information is the auditor’s task.
4. Short Term Versus Long Term. In the preceding three
pictures of shareholders and stock prices, the left-side interest has
been prone to a short-term time horizon, with the right side looking
to the long term. This follows from the respective investors’
characteristics. The market information that drives the left-side
interest bears primarily on the near term. The fundamental value that
drives the right side tends to have meaning only over the intermediate
89. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information
Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1125–26 (2003).
90. GALBRAITH, supra note 37, at 12–15.
91. “Tulipmania” was a bubble in the price of tulip bulbs in seventeenth century Holland.
See Peter M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535, 555–57 (1989). Garber argues that a
rational story supported the high prices in that rare bulbs because they had a high fundamental
value due to the sales of their offshoots. Id. at 555–57.
92. Differences of opinion of the effect of fundamental value go to whether the market
reacts correctly, underreacts, or overreacts. See SHLEIFER, supra note 81, at 112–13 (stipulating
that generally “security prices underreact to news such as earnings announcements,” but that
“over longer horizons of perhaps three to five years, security prices overreact to consistent
patterns of news pointing in the same direction”).
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or long term. Today, the appellations “short term” and “long term”
have come to stand in for Graham and Dodd’s terms speculation and
investment. The reference to time horizons avoids the pejorative
93
implication of Graham and Dodd’s label for the left-side investor.
This makes sense in a world where “shareholder value maximization”
keyed to today’s stock price has taken on a positive normative
94
connotation.
Under the shareholder value norm in circulation during the
1990s, the shareholders’ division according to time horizons has no
negative connotations for productivity. Present value theory brings all
95
time horizons together into today’s market price. If the EMH is
right, and the price reflects fundamental value, then directing
management to maximize present value holds out no risk of perverse
effects. To maximize fundamental value is to maximize today’s price.
Therefore, management confidently can invest for the long term
without having to worry about being punished by the left-side interest
in the stock market.96
In the 1980s, in contrast, shareholder value maximization
practice seemed more of a threat to management’s freedom to
97
invest. The leveraged restructuring movement, which was likewise
predicated on the theory of shareholder value maximization, denuded
management of investment discretion, even as it produced large,

93. Graham and Dodd pointed out that there is no clear line separating the short and long
terms and that one can “invest” short term and “speculate” long term. GRAHAM & DODD,
supra note 62, at 35–36.
94. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1278–87 (1999).
95. See Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 288–90 (1990) (describing idealized conditions wherein “shareholder
wealth maximization is nevertheless still beneficial to all shareholders,” regardless of their levels
of risk aversion).
96. Provided, of course, that management credibly can communicate its proprietary
information about future prospects to actors in the market. If it cannot, then a market tendency
to rely on short-term performance numbers can have perverse effects. See William W. Bratton
& Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The
Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 223 (1999) (providing
that management is averse to making long-term investments because of the challenge in
conveying “investment policy and the firm’s prospects” to market traders).
97. See Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry,
in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A
COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN, AND EUROPE 5–6 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997) (“The U.S.
system of capital allocation creates a divergence of interests between owners and corporations
that interferes with the flow of capital to those corporate investments that offer the highest
long-run payoffs.”).
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present payments in the form of tribute to shareholders long starved
98
of cash returns. The defenders of restructuring asserted the
transactions had the beneficial effect of constraining management’s
tendency to invest equity capital suboptimally, even as the
transactions had the effect of taking the subject firms private, thereby
99
The
insulating them from left-side shareholder influences.
transactions’ opponents claimed that high leverage entailed excessive
agency costs and choked off new investment.100 Eventually, history
defused the issue by consigning high leverage restructuring to its
scrap heap. Leveraged restructuring came to be seen as shock therapy
incurred in the normative transition from post-war managerialism to
101
the superior shareholder value regime of the 1990s, under which
managers invested for the long term even as they adhered to a norm
of present shareholder value maximization.102
The present crisis of confidence brings the left-side, short-term
shareholder interest back to the top of the list of corporate policy
problems. If the dirty deal story is accurate, observers in the 1990s
deluded themselves into thinking that stock option plans productively
had aligned management incentives with a unitary shareholder
interest. Management emerges in the story with a short-term, left-side
shareholding interest that triggers a perverse incentive to falsify
performance numbers, externalizing risks of enterprise on
103
shareholders with a long-term horizon. The shareholder of the
shareholder value maximization norm fragments accordingly.

98. William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 167–68.
99. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct.
1989, at 61, 65–72 (“[D]ebt is crucial to management discipline and resolving the conflict over
free cash flow.”).
100. Bratton, supra note 98, at 162–65.
101. See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger
Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001,
at 121, 127–37 (describing the beneficial effects of leveraged restructuring and the shift toward a
shareholder value perspective).
102. See Merton H. Miller, Is American Corporate Governance Fatally Flawed?, in STUDIES
IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS, supra note 97, at 38,
41–45 (rejecting “any permanent or systematic bias for U.S. firms in the aggregate toward
myopia or hyperopia, toward underinvestment or overinvestment relative either to the
shareholders’ or to society’s best interests”).
103. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 10–13 (“[T]he 1990’s was the decade in which senior
executive compensation shifted from being primarily cash-based to being primarily stock-based.
With this change, management became focused . . . on the likely future performance of their
firm’s stock over the short-run.”).
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Summary

The liquid, faceless trading market reacts daily to the varying
perspectives of left-side and right-side shareholders, aggregating and
resolving their differences in a single stock price. When the impact of
the differences is limited to the market floor, no political implications
need be discussed. But in the 1990s, shareholder demands,
particularly left-side shareholder demands, reached outward to
influence reporting practices. Earnings became something to be
managed before being reported, and auditors cooperated with the
practice. Pricing distortions resulted and, eventually, confidence
suffered. This Article’s next Part describes the link between the leftright politics of shareholding and 1990s earnings management.
II. MANAGED EARNINGS AND THE SHAREHOLDER INTEREST
All observers agree on the overriding importance of the audit,
regardless of their left- or right- side postures or their positions on
controversial topics like the EMH and the correctness of stock prices.
Equity valuation extrapolates from the earnings statement, and all
investors rely on its accuracy. The fact that this is one of the few
points of complete agreement in all of finance makes a crisis about
the numbers all the more disturbing.
Descriptions of the crisis concentrate on the audit failures
104
themselves, and on the incentives of the managers and auditors
105
responsible. This Part supplements those accounts, looking at 1990s
accounting through the different lenses of left- and right-side
shareholders. It shows that the right side, while disapproving of
aggressive accounting, also tends to be able to cope with it. And,
being conservative, it can survive on the downside as well as prosper
on the upside. The volatility comes from the left side, not only in
stock prices but in the view of reporting numbers. Accounting
treatments now widely condemned were viewed with favor or
indifference by left-side actors only a short time ago. Indeed, in the
late 1990s, the accounting industry even cited shareholder
complacency as a justification for the dirty deal. If the threat to
independence due to provision of nonaudit consulting services did not

104. See GAO Report, supra note 4, at 17–24 (describing the increasing number of large
companies being forced to restate their financial statements).
105. See generally Coffee, supra note 10, at 7 (relating “managerial and gatekeeper
compensation over the last two decades” to audit crises).
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upset the shareholders, then regulators should not intervene to
106
impose their more conservative views of the matter. And it worked
both ways: In the late 1990s, the supply-demand dynamic respecting
audit services operated to make auditors sensitive to the left-side
shareholder interest.107 Unfortunately for the auditors, stock market
reverses have a way of turning left-side shareholders into advocates of
conservative financial values. Declining stock prices triggered a shift
in shareholder demand from the left to the right side. Much of today’s
condemnation of aggressive accounting follows from the shift.
The same left to right shift occurred after 1929, with
108
conservatism prevailing for decades thereafter; but a left-side
demand for aggression eventually returned during the bull markets of
the 1960s and early 1970s.109 One can expect a similar cyclical return
110
to left-side perspectives at some point in the future. When that
occurs, the supply-demand signal respecting accounting treatments
could shift back as well. On this analysis, audit reform addressed only
to perverse incentives bound up in nonaudit consulting may not
provide a complete and enduring solution to the auditor incentive
problem.111 The incentive problem also stems from the corporate
governance system’s evolutionary assimilation of a norm of
112
shareholder responsiveness.

106. RICK ANTLE ET AL., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE FOR A
MULTI-CLIENT, MULTI-SERVICE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM, LAW & ECONOMICS
CONSULTING GROUP, INC. REPORT FOR AICPA 25–26 (1997), cited in Frankel et al., supra
note 16, at 8–9. The industry’s advocates also pointed to informational advantages and the
adequacy of legal liability constraints. Id. at 21–25.
107. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1357–58 (“The accounting profession has drifted into the
role of friendly service provider, lured by management bribes characterized as consultancy
fees.”).
108. See GALBRAITH, supra note 37, at 65 (stating that after the crash of 1929, “markets
were generally orderly and dull”).
109. See id. at 68–70 (describing the mood during this time as optimistic and “speculative”).
110. See id. at 12–19 (proffering that speculative excess is cyclical and will reemerge in the
future).
111. Significant consulting is still permitted. Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(g) (West Supp. 2003), largely repeats the substance of antecedent
regulations, falling well short of absolute prohibition. For a detailed comparison, see Bratton,
supra note 1, at 1030–35.
112. See Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 1278–87 (describing institutional investors’ increasing
level of activity). See also Bratton, supra note 1, at 1358–61 (explaining the connection between
the Enron failure and the shareholder value maximization norm).
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A. Exaggerated Reserves
Why, prior to 2002, were shareholders impervious to consulting’s
threat to independence and to aggressive accounting more generally?
To begin to answer this question, take a simple, relatively benign
example of 1990s earnings management—the cookie jar reserve. In
one version of this ploy, the issuer takes an extraordinary loss in a
given quarter respecting an unsuccessful line of business. The stock
price effect of the bad news is muted because the loss is a one-timeonly affair. Given, say, a $15 billion company, the market will not be
overly concerned as between a write off of $1.5 billion or $1.75
113
billion. So the company, which expects actual write offs over time to
total $1.5 billion, tops up the present deduction from earnings to $1.75
billion. The extra $250 million goes to the cookie jar. In a later
quarter when the earnings are coming in a tad less than what was
expected for that quarter, management conveniently revisits the loss
reserve and reduces it. The released sum supports earnings in the
later quarter.114 A cookie jar stash also can derive from any
overestimated cost; for example, unrealistically high estimates of any
of sales returns, loan losses, or warranty costs all can serve the
function.115
Management can offer a couple of justifications for the
manipulation. First, and foremost, investors prefer a series of
113. This is because analysts are concerned only about earnings from continuing operations
and filter out extraordinary gains and losses. BODIE ET AL., supra note 29, at 588.
114. The use of a “big bath” write-off to increase cookie jar reserves is constrained for
business exits commenced after December 31, 2002. Under ACCOUNTING FOR COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH EXIT OR DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 146 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2002), liabilities incurred in respect of
closures are to be recognized upon incurrence and not in advance.
115. See Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game,” Address at the NYU Center for Law and
Business (Sept. 28, 1998), at www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (“A third illusion played by some companies is using unrealistic
assumptions to estimate liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty
costs.”). The accounting crisis that engulfed Freddie Mac in June 2003 concerned this sort
accounting. The very existence of a scandal triggered by an earnings understatement
demonstrates the degree to which the investment community has completely reversed its
demands respecting reporting practice. One result of the restatement of Freddie Mac’s books is
worry among analysts of value decreasing volatility in the stock. See, e.g., Patrick Barta & John
D. McKinnon, Freddie May Have Understated Profits By Up to $4.5 Billion, WALL ST. J., June
26, 2003, at C1 (describing Freddie May’s accounting disclosures, which “suggest the company
was seeking to smooth the volatility of its earnings perhaps to impress investors who prefer
steady, predictable results”); Ken Brown, Heard on the Street: Bargain Hunters Hesitate with
Freddie Mac, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2003, at C1 (“Investors say their most basic concern is the
company’s accounting.”).
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116
smoothly increasing income figures. The draw-downs from the
cookie jar let management construct that steadily rising line of
earnings. The alternative option—reporting volatile earnings
numbers—will result in a higher value of r over time, and that hurts
the stock price.117 Such income smoothing does not necessarily corrupt
the trend, even as it beneficially reduces volatility. And since the
trend determines the long-run value, any misrepresentation is not
material.
Alternatively, management can argue that noise traders hype
every piece of news about fundamental value to such a degree that
118
some earnings management serves a higher shareholder interest. To
take an example, perhaps apocryphal, from the later 1990s, if the firm
misses its expected quarterly earnings number by one cent and the
overheated market as a result punishes the stock by bidding it down
10 percent, then a reserve that holds out the missing penny benefits
the shareholders.119 It allows management to anticipate and
counteract the left side’s behavioral shortcomings, protecting the
stock price from short-term market mood swings.
Shareholder responses to these explanations depend on the state
of the market and the politics of the particular shareholder.
To begin on the right side, the fundamental value investor will
oppose any manipulation of earnings figures through loss reserves.
Since this investor only cares about cash flows in the future, it wants
an unvarnished present report. Management advocacy that results in
smoother numbers makes it harder to work through to the most
accurate valuation. Since greater volatility means a higher r, the
appraiser needs accurate information about volatility so as to make
the adjustment. Indeed, this investor will question the whole practice
of setting aside the reserve. Better to expense the costs stemming

116. See Mary E. Barth et al., Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of Increasing
Earnings, 37 J. ACCT. RES. 387, 398–412 (1999) (showing that firms with patterns of higher
earnings have higher price/earnings ratios, controlling for other factors).
117. The rate of return r is a volatility measure. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 28, at
160–65 (demonstrating how r is calculated).
118. See Joseph B. Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street, 14 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 41, 42–43 (2002), for a description of quarter-to-quarter earnings pressures in the
late 1990s.
119. A 10 percent decline based on a one cent shortfall can be explained as rational. If stock
traders are skeptical about earnings figures and assume that management accounts aggressively,
then the one cent shortfall signals that management’s cookie jars have run out and all other
aggressive gimmicks have been used to the maximum. Given this read, the one cent shortfall
signals very bad news. Management, moreover, has no choice but to account aggressively.
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from closure of a line of business as they are incurred, not in advance,
thereby giving an unvarnished set of earnings numbers from period to
120
period.
The smart money and long-term investors will nod in agreement,
but there will be differences in their profiles. The smart money sees
through the ruse to the periodic cash flows, at least so long as the
published reports give it an adequate basis for doing so. It is only hurt
by cost of the analysis; but, because it is smart, it will do the analysis
anyway. For example, from a smart money point of view, there
arguably would have been nothing wrong with Enron’s practice of
pumping up its earnings numbers with results from sham transactions
with Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), so long as Enron fully disclosed
121
the transactions in the footnotes to its financials.
The long-term investor, once situated in a stock, presumably will
not be destabilized when management falls a couple of cents short of
expectations in the current quarter. At the same time, earnings
management, pursued in moderation, will not inflict any significant
injury on this investor. In the long run, the empirical cash flow
absolutely controls, and the long-run question is whether the
company produces competitively. Therefore, the long-term investor
would profess indifference to earnings management that manipulates
earnings figures to suit the short-term interest.
Now cross over to the left side and assume a shareholder who
buys a stock on a trend-chasing basis. The trend is that earnings are
rising. The holding period is short or intermediate without a definite
termination date. Given this profile, anything that might be hyped as
bad news could be destabilizing, causing this shareholder to sell,
thereby incurring tax and transaction costs. It follows that a little
finagling to avoid the firm being short on its earnings projections will
not be objectionable. Just by arranging the numbers, management
protects the shareholder from herself and the manic nature of the
market. A liquidity seller will be especially grateful for the income
smoothing.
But, unfortunately, earnings management holds out some
problems for left-side investors, even as they are its nominal
beneficiaries. It works well only so long as management massages the
120. For a fuller explication of this point of view, see infra note 174 and accompanying text.
121. For a description of the Enron fraud, see Bratton, supra note 1, at 1314–34. The most
shocking thing was that there was so little smart money. Basic points signaling distortions in
Enron’s financial presentation were in plain view. Id. at 1324–25.
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numbers to protect an upward trend that responds by staying on
trajectory for at least the intermediate term. Suppose that the upward
trend stalls, causing management to draw down from the cookie jar to
protect the slope of the line. There will be some shareholders who are
influenced to hold who might otherwise have sold because of the stall.
As to these investors, the income smoothing may or may not be
beneficial. It will certainly turn out to be detrimental if events make
clear that the upward trend stopped before the income smoothing.
Once the trend turns down, the manipulation undertaken protectively
becomes injurious. Indeed, all left-side investors’ interests then
presumptively lie in getting out in the first wave. Where the
unvarnished truth prompts that sale, income smoothing injures the
holder. The injury is even worse for the holder buying in reliance on
the manipulated numbers at or after the turning point in the trend.
With earnings management, then, the left-side investor, to which
management caters, could turn out to be an injured party. But the risk
of injury becomes hard to see in a bull market.
B. Revenues, Costs, Aggressive Accounting, and the Incentives of
Shareholders and Auditors
Cookie jar ruses lie on the benign end of aggressive accounting.
In fact, the stock prices of companies announcing restatements
respecting loss reserves have been known to go up when the
122
restatement entails an increase in present earnings. Manipulations
respecting revenue recognition and the taking of costs bear more
directly on the quality of the earnings statement. Revenue
overstatements make up the largest category of recent restatements,
at 38 percent, with cost understatements coming in second at 16
percent.123 These cases suggest a starker conflict between management
and shareholder interests. The misstating manager looks more
culpable, particularly given stock option exercises and stock sales
prior to the restatement. At the same time, the restatement holds out
more severe consequences for the shareholders: In the three-day
period surrounding the restatement, an average of 10 percent of the
restating company’s market capitalization disappears.124

122. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 23–24. The Report also shows that these restatements
make up only a small percentage of the total from 1997 to 2002.
123. Id. at 19–20.
124. Id. at 24.
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But even here, in the core territory of aggressive accounting and
audit failure, the shareholder interest, viewed over time, does not
unite against management and aggressive accounting. The
manipulation need not even imply a cruel day of reckoning. A
manager wanting to make her numbers for a quarter might do a little
“channel stuffing”—loading up customers’ inventories with the
company’s widgets to boost sales and earnings figures, inducing the
125
stepped-up widget sales with discounts or easy credit. The stuffing
robs the later period of sales revenues. But there need be no day of
reckoning if the next period’s sales growth suffices to make up for the
stuffed sales. So long as moderation is exercised, then, this revenue
enhancement device only smoothes the income trend. More extreme
manipulations do hold out a day of reckoning, of course. This
happened with WorldCom’s practice of capitalizing significant sums
that should have been expensed.126 Even with WorldCom, however,
legions of shareholders who sold in advance of the date of full
disclosure benefited mightily.127
From the left-side point of view, then, aggressive accounting is
problematic but not necessarily destructive. Even in extreme cases,
the benefits and detriments depend on who is left holding the stock
on the day of reckoning.
Consider a second statistic respecting restatements from 1997 to
2002: While 10 percent of listed companies announced restatements,
causing each company on average a contemporaneous loss of market
value of 10 percent, total losses due to restatements during the period
128
only amounted to 0.02 percent of the market’s total capitalization.
Assuming that all aggressive treatments applied by companies from
1997 to 2002 will not be triggering later value-destructive

125. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET AND CORPORATE
AMERICA DON’T WANT YOU TO KNOW 163 (2002).
126. WorldCom’s bankruptcy was triggered by the announcement that $3.9 billion of costs
of leasing other company’s networks had been capitalized rather than expensed. The (bogus)
theory of justification was that the unused capacity under the leases was incurred in anticipation
of future business. Jonathan Krim, Fast and Loose at WorldCom; Lack of Controls, Pressure to
Grow Set Stage for Financial Deceptions, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2002, at A1. If we take
WorldCom’s justification seriously, we get an innovative example of the new fair value
accounting: The treatment entails estimating future cash flows and discounting them to a
present value figure.
127. When a fraud maintains a stock price at an artificially high level over a period of time,
the fraud benefits all shareholders who sell prior to its discovery, whatever their motivations as
sellers.
128. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 26.
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restatements, then, from a left-side point of view, the bottom line
could be that the risks and returns of aggression vary with the case.
Restating the point, a strategic cost-benefit analysis is more
appropriate than a norm that prohibits aggressive accounting. Recall
in this regard the most famous fraud of all—the sham swaps between
Enron and its SPEs, entered into to paper over $1 billion of income
129
statement deductions stemming from portfolio losses. A reader of
the Powers Report, the product prepared by Enron’s special
committee investigation by independent directors, will see that the
transaction structures failed because stock market reverses in 2001
exceeded the parameters of extensive stress tests run by Enron’s
experts.130 Enron’s cost-benefit calculation went wrong only because
the market plummeted for unrelated, fundamental value reasons.
Had the market performed according to expectations, however, the
transaction structures need never have been the occasion for an
accounting restatement. The scandal-triggering treatment, then, easily
could have turned out a cost-benefit success. The wild card in these
calculations is left-side shareholder demand, which follows the state
of the market. Cost-benefit calculations accordingly shifted across the
board after the market turned down in 2001, and the downside risks
of aggression increased in magnitude.
This picture of risk-return tradeoffs also fits the auditing firms of
the late 1990s. The firms, emboldened by decreasing risks of liability,
131
reappraised the downside risk of audit failure. They acted out the
relationship PV = A/r, stepping out of the low return modes of
independence and conservatism and riding with the rising market.
When a nonaudit consultant sells earnings management services, the
transactional economics differ from those attending the sale of the
same advice by the firm’s auditor. The nonaudit consultant takes no
formal responsibility for the consequences of its advice, and can walk
away in the event of ex post scrutiny (subject to such derivative
liability as the system attaches).132 The auditor, in contrast, makes a

129.
130.

See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1305–20, for a description of the transactions.
WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 98, 103–04
(2002); Bratton, supra note 1, at 1316–18.
131. Coffee, supra note 10, at 25–30. For a description of the mindset of reporting managers,
see Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1146–51.
132. Cases on investment banker opinions issued in connection with mergers assay the
liability question. Compare In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 9483, 1990 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 14, at *17–22 (Feb. 12, 1990) (holding that the special committee’s investment
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formal pronouncement on the firm’s numbers, performing a
necessary compliance function and staking its reputational capital on
133
the numbers’ quality. Its gatekeeper role adds value to its consulting
services. The accounting firms turned consulting into a premium
business because they credibly could tie the consulting services to the
audit endorsement.134 Such a premium, high-return service, carried an
appropriately high risk for the auditor’s reputational capital.
Viewed retrospectively, the cost-benefit appraisal may seem illadvised, at least for Enron’s auditor, the ill-fated Arthur Andersen
firm. But ex ante things looked different. Andersen, acting in the leftside frame of mind of the 1990s, presumably appraised the risk with a
view to the sky high market capitalizations of Enron and other clients.
Like a left-side investor, it mistook that market value for fundamental
value, no doubt telling itself new economy stories and other left-side
135
claptrap then in circulation. The prestige of the EMH also may have
skewed the risk-return appraisal. If the market price reflects
fundamental value, then one has little reason to factor heavily a
downside projection of a marketplace full of left-side investors,
market regulators, reporters, and prosecutors, acting out the
unpleasant, vindictive behavior pattern that accompanies a rough
downside shift. If fundamental value is there in the price, no collapse
can occur. Meanwhile, the Final Four accounting firms pick up
Andersen’s clients even as they confront litigation and enforcement
costs due to their own audit failures.136 For these four firms, it is too
soon to know whether the tradeoff of the 1990s proves detrimental or
137
beneficial in the long run.
banker is not an agent of the shareholders), with Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express,
Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (App. Div. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1988)
(refusing to dismiss a complaint based on an agency theory).
133. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 231–40.
134. Coffee, supra note 10, at 27–30.
135. For a summary, see BRATTON, supra note 39, at 168–70.
136. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Who Are Winners at Andersen’s Yard Sale?, WALL ST. J., May
30, 2002, at C1 (“[O]ther firms are taking the risk that hiring lots of Andersen partners could
end up bogging them down in legal-liability issues stemming from Andersen’s botched audits of
Enron Corp.”).
137. In cases where audit failure coincides with the collapse of the business, the left-side
stockholder victims, who also believed that the fundamental value really was there, tend to see
it two ways. Either they have been robbed or someone has defrauded them. In the case of
Enron it was indeed the latter, but only to some extent. At Enron and across the exchange,
much of the fundamental value never was there in the first place and the stock price eventually
was going to collapse whether or not overstated earnings figures propped it up for extra time.
The crisis of confidence accordingly is mostly a left-side crisis stemming from price declines due
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C. Summary
On the upside, earnings management works beautifully and
presently favorable market results have a way of validating business
practices. In a bear market, however, left-side investors overreact to
the bad news. They also do an about-face on earnings management,
suddenly demanding unvarnished truth. What the left side approved,
accepted, or did not question on the upside, it has excoriated since
January 28, 2002. For a particularly stark example of this born-again
conservatism, we can look not to an investor but to an economic
theorist, Professor Michael Jensen. In 1978, Professor Jensen stated
that “there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid
empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market
Hypothesis.”138 He went on to provide critical theoretical justification
139
for the leveraged restructurings of the 1980s. Then he put the 1990s
on track with a famous argument for the productivity advantages of
stock option compensation.140 All three interventions found their way
into the deep structure of theoretical support for the short-termism of
the late 1990s. In 2002, Professor Jensen’s line changed abruptly:
Managers must be forthright and promise only those results they
have a legitimate prospect of delivering, and they must be clear
about the risks and uncertainties involved. They must dispel any air
of unreality that settles over their stock and highlight what they
cannot do as readily as they trumpet their prospects . . . .
Managers must recognize that an overvalued stock can be damaging
141
to the long-run health of the company . . . .

Graham and Dodd could not have put it better.

to the absence of fundamental value. See GAO Report, supra note 4, at 26–30 (discussing
surveys of investor confidence). Audit quality is a secondary matter.
138. Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN.
ECON. 95, 95 (1978).
139. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323–25 (1986). (“[G]oing private and leveraged buyout (LBO)
transactions . . . . are creating a new organizational form that competes successfully with the
open corporate form because of advantages in controlling the agency costs of free cash flow.”).
Id. at 325.
140. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261–62 (1990) (showing that executive pay is insufficiently
sensitive to performance).
141. Fuller & Jensen, supra note 118, at 45.
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III. THE SHAREHOLDER BENEFICIARY
AND THE CHOICE OF TREATMENT
All sides now join in the call for a return to probity in reporting
and audit practice. The job of bringing this about and reforming the
auditor-client relationship goes to the new Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) established by the Sarbanes142
Oxley Act, along with the audit committees of the various boards of
143
directors. This Part considers whether the PCAOB and the audit
committees feasibly can make normative choices about accounting
treatments and audit practice by reference to a shareholder
beneficiary.
Section A poses a hypothetical choice between three different
accounting treatments and searches for a shareholder model that
provides a point of reference for a gatekeeper charged with
determining the correct accounting treatment. Four alternative
models are proposed: the smart money shareholder, a firm-specific
composite shareholder, a constituency model, and the fundamental
value investor. None proves adequate taken alone; conflicts with
investor protection policies also arise. But a plausible composite
model emerges from the combination of the fundamental value
investor, with its preference for conservative treatments, and the
dumb money investor, with its need for paternal protection. Such a
model would receive general approval in the present political context.
Section B asks whether a continuing basis of support can be projected
for this model, answering in the negative. So long as shareholder
capitalism prevails, managers will remain vulnerable to left-side
demands. Management will always prefer an auditor with a
reputation for flexibility respecting aggressive treatments and avoid
an auditor with a reputation for conservative probity. It follows that
even if we could derive a set of conservative instructions, it would
have to be imposed by regulation.

142. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 103(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7213(c) (West Supp. 2003)
(“The Board shall cooperate on an ongoing basis with professional groups of accountants . . .
and advisory groups . . . in the examination of the need for changes in any standards subject to
its authority . . . .”).
143. See id. § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (mandating audit committees made up of independent
directors and with power to engage independent outside advisors).
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A. Modeling the Auditor’s Shareholder Beneficiary
Hypothesize a firm with a choice of three accounting treatments:
Under Number 1, this year’s earnings are $1,000,000,000; under
Number 2, earnings will be $1,050,000,000; and under Number 3,
earnings will be $950,000,000. All are either clearly GAAP or can be
defended in good faith as GAAP.144 Where do management and the
auditor go for a norm or rule that instructs them as to the choice
among the three treatments?
Three alternatives present themselves in short order. First,
145
GAAP has a norm that signals treatment Number 3 —an accounting
convention termed “conservatism.”146 For present purposes, the
conservatism convention sends a simple message: when in doubt,
understate. To the extent one understates when in doubt, there
remains little room for aggressive accounting. The convention,
however, is not mandatory.147 Absent a clear instruction from GAAP,
the second alternative must be considered: to leave the choice among
the treatments in the envelope of management’s business judgment.
But if one lacks confidence in management’s incentives respecting the
148
choice, and one does in 2003, then one turns to a third alternative:
return to GAAP and revise it so as to narrow the range of choices.
The question is whether the shareholder interest holds out a
fourth alternative: Can one look to the interests of a shareholder
144. It is not unrealistic to hypothesize $100,000,000 of running room. Under audit practice
in the 1990s, management got an automatic 5 percent leeway under a rule-like application of
GAAP’s materiality principle. Arthur Levitt objected. Levitt, supra note 115, at 4–6. He had a
good point. If being one cent short on one’s numbers meant a 10 percent stock decline, then a
per se 5 percent noncompliance allowance was likely to have manipulative results. The SEC
intervened. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17
C.F.R. pt. 211, subpart B (2003) (amended Aug. 12, 1999) (“[P]rovid[ing] guidance in applying
materiality thresholds to the preparation of financial statements filed with the Commission and
the performance of audits of those financial statements.”).
145. Assuming that the choice among the three treatments implicates no issues of balance
sheet conservatism. See infra notes 173–176 and accompanying text.
146. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 67–71, term this a “modifying convention[],”
distinguishing it from accounting’s collection of seven more fundamental principles.
Conservatism is summed up in the accountants’ adage: “[A]nticipate no profits but anticipate all
losses.” Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings,
24 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 7 (1997) (quoting JAMES H. BLISS, MANAGEMENT THROUGH
ACCOUNTS (1924)).
147. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 71, describe conservatism as a “practical
consideration[]” to be drawn on in interpreting and applying accounting principles.
148. For a thorough presentation of incentive problems leading managers to favor
inaccurate treatments, see Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Oren Bar-Gill, Misreporting Corporate
Performance 7–33 (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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beneficiary for instructions as to the choice among Numbers 1, 2 and
3? To answer the question in the affirmative is to model the auditor’s
professional duties in the framework of an agency relationship. But,
depending on how one models the shareholder, the firm, and the
stock price, one can elicit at least four possible sets of instructions.
1. Irrelevance: The Smart Money as Beneficiary. The EMH
holds out a distinct notion of the shareholder when it asserts that
149
right-side, smart money shareholders determine the market price.
From this point of view, the choice of treatment is irrelevant so long
as management discloses enough information to make the
preparation of the books transparent to the smart money. With full
disclosure, the smart money can translate the accounting numbers
back into appropriate net cash flow projections. It follows that under
these conditions accounting treatments never result in market
manipulation.150
This irrelevance story becomes less persuasive as one looks at the
left-side interest and interpolates noise into the picture of the market
price. With noise in the price, the choice of treatment does have
market value implications (if not necessarily long-run fundamental
value implications). As a backstop, the EMH proponent can assert an
intermediate view that admits the noisiness of prices but nonetheless
suggests that one structure market regulation as if the story told in
orthodox financial economics was true. The notion is that noise
traders will in the long run be pushed toward rationality if the
regulatory structure treats them as if they were well-informed rational
actors. Restating, even though the markets are like jungles, they are
better left unregulated. Paternalism only protects the dumb money
unproductively. Better to let it learn its lesson and smarten up or be
ground under by the heel of history.
To accept this view is to dismiss Sarbanes-Oxley’s PCAOB and
rely on a long-term market corrective. Even if one does that, this “as
if” heuristic does not hold out instructions as to the choice among
treatments. It merely returns one to the EMH position, which

149. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
150. This point of view was once taken very seriously. See, e.g., Ray Ball & Philip R. Brown,
An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J. ACCT. RES. 159, 174–76 (1968)
(arguing that the market anticipates the bulk of annual accounting numbers); Eugene E.
Comiskey, Market Response to Changes in Depreciation Accounting, 46 ACCT. REV. 279, 284
(1971) (showing higher earnings due to rule change did not move stock prices).
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instructs that the decision is irrelevant so long as the smart money can
151
see it.
2. The Real World Shareholder as Beneficiary. Alternatively,
under a sociological approach, a profile of the real-world shareholder
152
would be derived, firm by firm. Management (and by extension the
auditor) would do a survey of the shareholder population to find out
the kind of clientele attracted by the firm. A high-water dot-com
presumably would have a clientele of volatile noise traders looking
for easy money, whereas a boring but solid company like Proctor &
Gamble would have a more fundamental-value-oriented group of
holders. But this approach suffers from intrinsic limitations. By
modeling the beneficiary on the mean investor you leave out the
outliers. Alternatively, some companies could have bipolar groups.
Even if one derived a profile, the makeup of the group could change
over time. Or, more likely, with today’s complicated holding patterns,
an investor profile will be hard to ascertain in the first place. On
consideration, then, this approach does not seem helpful.153
But if the inquiry is redirected to the firm and away from the
investor, there emerges a sharper notion of the role for regulation.
Now the idea is that each firm makes disclosures about its financial
reporting philosophy and operative policies in advance and hews to
the profile over time. Conservative and aggressive firms thus separate
themselves by profile and auditors sign off annually on the accuracy
of the description. The shareholders then sort themselves out as they
154
may. To the extent the particular holder deems a particular
reporting approach material, she adjusts her portfolio accordingly.

151. It is noted that the EMH model of the shareholder dovetails with a strong reputational
model of auditor incentives. This view has informed case law to the effect that auditors are
highly unlikely to participate in client frauds. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629
(7th Cir. 1990) (“An accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by
its reputation for careful work.”).
152. For an example of thinking along these lines, see HAROLD BIERMAN, JR. & SEYMOUR
SMIDT, THE CAPITAL BUDGETING DECISION: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND FINANCING OF
INVESTMENT PROJECTS 290–93 (3d ed. 1966).
153. The point follows from the economists’ view that shareholder preferences should not
influence investment policy. For a summary of the literature, see Hu, supra note 95, at 287–88.
154. For analogous suggestions, see Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure,
66 VA. L. REV. 85, 108–29 (1980) (discussing disclosure of dividend policy). See also Ian Ayres,
Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 992–98
(1991) (suggesting that corporations disclose their policies of “corporate speech” in advance).
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The SEC’s current proposal for disclosure of critical accounting
155
policies follows this approach.
To the extent this approach enhances transparency, it results in a
disclosure system better equipped for the EMH perspective described
above. But the clientele theory articulated here differs significantly
because it brings left-side shareholders within the group of actors to
156
be protected by regulation.
3. All Constituents as Beneficiaries. A clear instruction could
follow from the reconstruction of the fiduciary model to encompass
all parties in interest in the firm. This entails replacing the
shareholder value paradigm with a model that includes multiple
beneficiaries—creditors, other contract counterparties, and
employees as well as shareholders. This is a route to a conservative
set of instructions. Lenders, having a limited or no chance for capital
appreciation, do negative analyses looking to default risk.157 On the
158
downside, they look to hard asset values. Firm application of the
conservatism convention accordingly suits their informational
interest.159 In the standard picture, the employees are similarly risk
averse. An ethical point of view, centered on avoidance of injury, also
160
favors this approach.

155. See generally Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About the
Application of Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8098, Exchange Act
Release No. 45,907, [2001–2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,638 (May 10,
2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228–29, 249) (covering assumptions behind highly
uncertain estimates and disclosure of reasons behind the selection of treatments).
156. The new Regulation G, which requires issuers disclosing pro forma results to reconcile
those results with GAAP numbers, is an example of this. The smart money takes the pro forma
results for what they are worth; the dumb money gets fooled and needs protection. See generally
Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8176,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,226, [2002–2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
86,816 (Jan. 22, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228–29, 244, 249).
157. GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 31, at 315–23.
158. Id. at 353.
159. Conservatism in accounting has been attributed to the bankers’ interest. See
QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, Statement of Concepts No.
2, § 94 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1980) (“Once the practice of providing information
about periodic income as well as balance sheets became common . . . it also became evident that
understated assets frequently led to overstated income in later periods.”).
160. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has approved this approach. In United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, (1984), it said: “The independent public accountant performing this
special [public] function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public.” Id. at 817–18. The Court held that the auditor
may not claim an evidentiary privilege for workpapers. Id.
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Unfortunately, this constituent-based conservatism is not
politically correct as a matter of corporate law, nor, one suspects, in
161
the view of many economists. Nor is it correct as a matter of
contemporary securities law policy, which is moving away from
accounting conservatism.
This move from conservatism follows from dissatisfaction with
the historical cost principle, which exalts verifiability over real-world
verisimilitude. When an asset is booked at historical cost, the original
162
purchase price provides a verifiable source for its reported value.
The problem comes years later when the verifiable figure understates
the asset’s economic value. Fair value accounting, in contrast,
contemplates a later upward restatement of the asset’s book value to
reflect the higher market value, even where the higher market value
has not been verified by a closing price in a trading market.
Conservatism favors cost accounting over fair value accounting
because fair value sacrifices verification, and verification is
conservatism’s bedrock. Indeed, the accounting literature describes
conservatism as the requirement of a higher level of verification for
good news to be booked as gain than for bad news to be booked as
loss.163
Contemporary opinion in the world of securities policy welcomes
GAAP’s steps in the direction of fair value treatments—most
famously the acceptance of mark to market treatments respecting
164
165
derivatives and accounting for mergers. In the case of derivatives,
the booked amounts come from computer programs; in the case of
mergers, the reporting company commissions a periodic appraisal.
The theory in both cases is that fair value treatments produce more
meaningful numbers because they follow from concepts and

161. Unsurprisingly, the leading statement of the shareholder primacy position in the legal
literature was made by an economist. Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE
L.J. 1197, 1207–15 (1984). There is a view in the accounting literature that conservatism is an
efficient contracting technology, with verifiability being the key to the efficiency effect. See
generally Ross L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting (Dec. 16, 2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Duke Law Journal), for a description and a literature summary.
162. HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 67–68, 70.
163. Basu, supra note 146, at 4, 7.
164. ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES, Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1998).
165. GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 142 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2001).
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166
techniques of valuation practice. The intended beneficiary is the
167
left-side shareholder. Because the exercise of translating accounting
numbers to valuation numbers takes sophistication or, alternatively,
resources, the move to fair value has a democratizing effect. But it
also comes at a cost. The shift to fair value puts the whole system on a
track away from conservatism and toward soft reported figures that
build in management advocacy. Valuation, after all, is inherently
uncertain. It remains to be seen whether the crisis of confidence chills
further movement down this track on the ground that the risk of selfserving misstatement outweighs the benefits to left-side
shareholders.168

4. The Fundamental Value Investor as Beneficiary. Finally, the
shareholder can be modeled as a right-side fundamental value
169
shareholder. This approach abandons the quest for a real-world
shareholder model in the wake of a normative decision to seek
guidance from financial conservatism.
But, having gone that far, some choices remain to be made. A
question arises as to whether to model a fundamental value investor
with a long-term time horizon, or to leave the time horizon open.
Strong opinions can be expected to be heard on the matter.
According to one school of thought, the shareholder value
170
maximization norm dictates that no time horizon be mentioned,
leaving open a door for disinvestment and 1980s-style restructurings.
An opposing school of thought argues for the long-term horizon so as
171
to encourage capital investment.
166. See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair
Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1846–49 (1996)
(discussing benefits and dangers of fair value treatments).
167. The smart money does its own valuations.
168. The SEC’s post–Sarbanes-Oxley rules address the problem by requiring disclosure of
assumptions in Management’s Discussion and Analysis. About the Application of Critical
Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8098, Exchange Act Release No. 45,907, [2001–
2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,638 (May 10, 2002) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 228–29, 249). For the argument that the audit crisis implies a let up in the movement
to fair value, see Bratton, supra note 1, at 1352–58.
169. For a discussion along these lines, see Hu, supra note 95, at 290–91.
170. See id. at 355 (“[U]nder appropriate assumptions and in an idealized world, publicly
held corporations can arrive at investment decisions which all shareholders would prefer
without determining or taking into account the particular time or risk preferences of individual
shareholders.”).
171. See Porter, supra note 97, at 7–8 (“Sustained private investment can not only improve
the skills of employees, increase the capabilities of supporting industries, or upgrade the
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The stakes change if one restricts the inquiry to the audit context.
In the post-bubble environment, the short-term time horizon has a
deservedly bad name in respect to reporting incentives due to the
spectacle of managers hiding behind aggressive accounting while
172
selling stock in advance of collapse. At present, therefore, most
observers can be expected to opt for the long-term perspective
concerning the fundamental value audit beneficiary.
Another decision that needs to be made concerns the inclusion in
the beneficiary model of the smart money investor. Recall that the
smart money seeks full disclosure only. To the extent the analysis
behind the treatment is disclosed, the smart money can protect itself
and need not worry much about the way the treatments impact the
bottom line. In contrast, the dumb money will be bottom-line
oriented, and thus, the choice of treatment matters a great deal to this
shareholder. Thus, for purposes of overall confidence, it is better to
address financial reports to both sides of the dumb-smart binary.
Speaking roughly, this is the approach that informs the securities
laws.
What signal is yielded by this combination of the long-term
fundamental value perspective with protection of the dumb money?
As to conservatism versus aggression on matters of revenue and cost
recognition, one gets a strong conservative signal.
Two important caveats need to be entered, however. The first
concerns fair value treatments. One can expect right-side interests to
take verifiability more seriously than do contemporary securities
regulators. A policy dispute therefore arises in respect to this
accommodation of the dumb money.
The second caveat concerns cases where the conservatism bound
up in the long-term fundamental value perspective comes into conflict
with conservative accounting. Such conflicts arise when balance-sheet
understatement means a sacrifice in income-statement accuracy. The
conservative shareholder looks to an accurate income statement. A
prominent line of accounting conservatism (and the creditor interest)
173
opts for understatement of the balance sheet. The loss reserves

sophistication of consumer demand, but also generates local ‘externalities’ . . . . [which] play a
crucial role in building competitiveness.”).
172. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 934 (2003).
173. The classic case concerns cost accounting for assets. The cost cap means depreciation
deductions are lower over the life of the asset. By implication, earnings are overstated. See
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discussed in Part II provide an example of this conflict. The balancesheet conservative anticipates the loss and creates the reserve, writing
down the assets. As a result, losses are taken before their actual
174
realization. The income-statement conservative objects to this—to
get an accurate picture of the income stream, the advance write-down
treatment will need to be unwound and the losses recognized only
upon incurrence. But this ongoing policy dispute amounts to a
conservative family quarrel. Its outcomes imply tradeoffs rather than
right or wrong answers175 and entail no fundamental challenge to the
conservative norm.
B. Market Correction versus Regulation
One emerges from the foregoing discussion positing a
shareholder modeled from the right side and moving to conservative
treatments. How deep and enduring is investor support for this
approach?
Right-side shareholder support can be assumed. Left-side voices
and management can be expected to resist this approach much of the
time. But, given today’s crisis of confidence, conservatism looks more
welcome than usual to the left side. There should follow a shift of
demand respecting audit practice, a shift bearing on current audits.
Because shareholding entails a dynamic politics, however, the
duration of this tilt toward conservatism needs to be projected.
A long-term projection would be risky. To see why, recall Arthur
Andersen as it flailed in crisis. To regain a reputation for probity, it
brought in Paul Volcker, a renowned financial conservative, as a sort
176
Volcker surprised everybody by
of constitutional monarch.
announcing that he was going to turn Andersen into the one
conservative auditing firm.177 Had Andersen’s other problems not

AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN
NO. 2 (1939).
174. See Watts, supra note 161, at 1 (“[T]he greater the difference in degree of verification
required for gains versus losses, the greater the conservatism.”).
175. At present, income statement accuracy has gained the upper hand. See ACCOUNTING
FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH EXIT OR DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 146 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2002) (limiting loss
reserves).
176. Janet Whitman, Questioning the Books: Volcker Announces Members of Board to
Study Andersen, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2002, at A4.
177. See, e.g., Devon Spurgeon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Can Andersen Partners Keep Their
Firm Alive?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2002, at C1 (“[U]nder [Volcker’s plan] . . . the firm would
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overwhelmed it, could it have prospered as a self-defined
conservative firm? At first blush, one would think so. There is a rightside investor interest out there; no doubt there even are right-side
managers. By hiring the auditor that always says no to aggression,
conservative firms can send a credible signal to the markets about the
reliability of their bottom lines and raise their stock prices. It has
been argued that there is a market for such a firm, but that industry
178
concentration precludes its emergence. If there existed twelve or
fifteen firms with the resources to audit large capitalization
companies, rather than only four, things would be different.
Despite the concentration argument’s strong logic, the auditorclient incentive structure supports a contrary picture. It is instructive
to return to Andersen and Volcker and take a look at the reaction of
the other four accounting firms. Until Volker’s announcement, they
had stood in solidarity with Andersen. But when Volcker announced
a conservative profile, they immediately and publicly separated
179
Fear of loss of business to a
themselves from Andersen.
reinvigorated Andersen does not appear to have been responsible.
The other firms manifestly viewed the conservative strategy as a
defection from a norm held among the group. Consulting rents
provide the primary explanation, as usual; but the management
interest may also be wielding a stick here, in addition to holding out
the carrot of consulting rents.
Return to the shareholders in their left-right differentiation.
Contemporary managers worry about the stock price. They have
done so ever since the takeover battles of the 1980s destabilized the
180
security of tenure they enjoyed during the postwar period. Today,
of course, management worries less that a low stock price means a
takeover than it worries that a low stock price creates frictions in its
relations with the institutional investors who have become
empowered actors in corporate politics. The institutions want results
and have tools to register public disapproval when results are not

shed all of its nonauditing businesses, among other steps to avoid any future conflicts of interest
that would undermine audit integrity.”).
178. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1414 (2002) (“[I]n a market this concentrated, implicit collusion develops
easily.”).
179. Michael Schroeder & Greg Hitt, Questioning the Books: Big Accounting Firms Break
Ties with Andersen to Resist Charges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2002, at A10.
180. William W. Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1517–25 (1989).
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forthcoming. Any such expression of public disapproval by a
significant voice in the financial community destabilizes the
181
institutional environment of the CEO and the top team. These
shareholder value opinion-makers may be well educated in the
difference between noise and fundamental value and otherwise fit the
right-side profile. Yet recent experience suggests that they can tip the
political scales to the left.182 Many agents in the world of investment
institutions worry about their quarterly bottom lines and having their
183
portfolios judged against those of comparable funds. They must
watch what moves the market, as opposed to watching long-term
fundamentals. This puts them in the thick of the noise.
Now return to the hypothetical’s treatments Number 1, 2, and 3.
In an unstable institutional environment, it makes no sense for
management to engage an audit firm possessing a powerful
reputational incentive to refuse to give its opinion when management
chooses Number 2, overstating its earnings. The $100,000,000 spread
at issue could figure importantly in respect to the top team’s
reputation amongst the institutions. Managers, even managers
conservatively disposed, will want the flexibility to cater to the left
side. In the hypothetical, since all the treatments are GAAP,
managers can cater to the left with aggressive earnings accounting
without a risk of audit failure and restatement.184
A risk of audit failure easily can be introduced by changing the
facts of the hypothetical. Now Number 2 is an innovative, aggressive
treatment that follows from a highly constructed theory of revenue
185
recognition. Number 2’s adoption in 2003 seems unlikely. But the
left-side preference as between conservatism and aggression will be

181. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1911–14 (1995).
182. SHLEIFER, supra note 81, at 181–83. See also Lakonishok et al., supra note 68, at 1575–
76 (demonstrating “the preference of both individual and institutional investors for glamour
strategies and . . . avoidance of value strategies”).
183. SHLEIFER, supra note 81, at 181–83.
184. Presumably, a manager rationally would opt for low audit quality even if the market
penalizes the stock price so long as the penalty is lower than the cost to management of hiring a
conservative auditor. Empirical studies show strongly that the big accounting firms produce
higher quality audits. See, e.g., Connie L. Becker et al., The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings
Management, 15 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 5–8 (1998) (summarizing the literature). The
proposition here is that no incentives operate to push any one of the big firms to a higher level
within the group.
185. See supra note 126 (describing WorldCom).
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dynamic in time. So it still makes no sense to box oneself in with an
inflexible, conservative auditor.
Expanding shareholder empowerment, supposedly the great
governance achievement of this era, implies that the management will
always want an auditor with a reputation for flexibility. Even if
conservatism makes sense this year, it may be the last thing
management wants next year to the extent the choice of treatment
follows shareholder demands. There results a problem for the flexible
auditor in the form of a risk of audit failure. That presumably is why
the Final Four audit firms feared the contrast a conservative
Andersen would have afforded and why they have lobbied for
PCAOB to pursue a cooperative, rather than adversarial, regulatory
186
strategy.
From a fundamental value and long-term point of view, it follows
that the PCAOB should be aggressive in its review of accounting
187
treatments. Management’s zone of discretion in applying GAAP
needs to be contained. Auditors who fail to impose appropriate
treatments need to be disciplined. This Article’s Conclusion considers
the conceptual framework in which these constraints will be imposed,
suggesting that leaving the shareholder beneficiary out of the
framework will make for a smoother road going forward.
Before considering the regulatory framework, a deregulatory,
spontaneous-order argument should be noted. It is said that
accounting has become consistently more conservative across the
twentieth century, primarily as the result of pressure from contract
counterparties needing verifiable financial information. Empirical
188
studies support the assertion. The problem for the resulting
deregulatory argument is that the long-term trend toward
conservatism appears to have ceased in the face of the vigorous
shareholder interest of the 1990s. Other studies in the same literature
show marked increases in conservatism resulting from increases in the

186. See Bratton, supra note 9, at 1033–34 (describing the scandal surrounding Harvey Pitt’s
naming of William Webster as PCAOB chair).
187. Alternatively, the structure of auditor engagement could be changed radically. Under
the leading proposal, companies would purchase insurance against losses due to accounting
failure and publicize the terms of the insurance; the carrier would then engage the auditor.
Joshua Ronen, Post–Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-Visited, 8
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 39, 48–53 (2002).
188. The presence of conservative practice has been documented extensively. See, e.g., Basu,
supra note 146, at 11–31 (showing reports to be more sensitive to bad news).
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189
scope of auditor liability. Given the present crisis, this literature
accordingly has no compelling negative implications for regulatory
190
policy.

IV. CONCLUSION
To the extent that auditors, audit committees, and the PCAOB
must model a shareholder beneficiary, they should by all means
model a long-term fundamental value investor, or, depending on the
issue, model dumb money in need of the protection of a conservative
authority figure. But it is not clear that the occasion for modeling
need arise at all. Consider these sentences from Chief Justice
191
Burger’s opinion in United States v. Arthur Young:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a
corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with
the client . . . . This “public watchdog” function demands that the
accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times
192
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.

If the auditor’s public responsibility transcends its client relationship,
it follows that reference to a shareholder beneficiary holds out a
constant possibility of compromising independence.
A positive law approach that dispenses with the model of the
beneficiary and takes the auditor out of an agency role provides an
alternative. Under this approach, the auditor comes to the client as an
193
independent contractor under a legally mandated contract, and the
auditor comes to the mandated contract as the representative of the
accounting system. Its professionalism derives from the system rather

189. For both the theory and a summary of the empirical literature, see Watts, supra note
161, at 1–3, 15–26. The institutional history of the accounting profession and of regulation of the
profession also should be cited. O’Connor, supra note 24, at 6–9, shows that federal securities
laws are responsible in significant part for the profession’s growth and consolidation.
190. It also should be noted that the assertion here—that management will want to keep its
options open and will hire an accommodating auditor—is not inconsistent with the proposition
that marketplace demands can mean an increase in conservatism over time.
191. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
192. Id. at 817–18.
193. See Securities Act of 1933 sched. A, item 25, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000) (requiring an
independent public or certified accountant to file a detailed balance sheet of the issuer);
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000) (outlining the procedures
an independent public accountant must follow when auditing an issuer in order to properly
investigate and report illegal activities).
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than from the client relation. Its fidelity also goes to the system—to
the rulebook—rather than to the shareholders. Firms are managed
for their shareholders. Numbers can be reported for their own sake.
This positivist approach puts an academic gloss on the most basic
rule in the auditing profession’s ethical canon: The auditor is not to
194
hold the client’s stock. Even so, it can be questioned under a line of
criticism currently circulating respecting GAAP. The critics charge
that GAAP has failed as a jurisprudence because it relies too heavily
on rules. The rules, it is said, are manipulated by managers, auditors,
and consultants toward the end of reports that misstate economic
reality. A principles-based system, as presently offered in
International Accounting Standards, would be superior because it
would be less manipulable.195 This criticism prompted section 108(d)
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which orders a study of principles-based
196
accounting. If the criticism is well taken then a positivist framework
for articulating auditors’ duties makes little sense and only
exacerbates the problem.
There can be no denying that practitioners often take advantage
of GAAP’s rule structures when they design aggressive treatments.
Regulatory arbitrage—the practice of structuring an inappropriate
197
transaction so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule —clearly
has been widespread. But these rule-based aggressive treatments,
which tend to involve structured finance, leases, and (until recently)
pooled mergers, do not show up in large numbers on the list of recent
198
restatements. The reason is that the rules make the treatments
compliant with GAAP, even as many observers disapprove of the
194. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2(c)(1) (2003).
195. For a summary of the debate, see Bratton, supra note 9, at 1045–47.
196. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7218(d) (West Supp. 2003). The
study, which has been released is broadly supportive of GAAP, even as it suggests that rules
should not be articulated too finely and accounting principles can be better drafted. See
generally OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT & OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, STUDY
PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY
THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING
SYSTEM (2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (stating that imperfections arise when financial standards rely solely on
principles or rules and recommending an improved system merely based on principles or
objectives). This Article adds an additional point: However well drafted GAAP’s rules and
standards, they are likely to be misapplied by accountants beholden to the interests of managers
and left-side shareholders.
197. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation and the Compliance Norm 29–30 (Jan. 29, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
198. Nelson et al., supra note 5, at 30–31.
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199
treatments. Issues still arise for the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), accounting’s legislature.200 But the indicated course of
action appears to be amendment of the rules to adjust their categories
to yield reporting results that follow from the rules’ operative
principles.201 A more fundamental jurisprudential issue concerning the
relative desirability of rules and standards is not necessarily
implicated. GAAP, moreover, operates in the very territory where a
rule-based approach is most strongly justified: GAAP governs
homogenous, recurrent situations where the actors need ex ante
instructions and have incentives to invest in compliance.202 An acrossthe-board shift to standards would make sense only if the costs of
constant revision of the rules to keep up with unintended applications
due to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage outweighed the
benefits of advance specification. GAAP does not appear to lie
anywhere near that level of dysfunction.
The restatements follow less from regulatory arbitrage than from
strategic noncompliance—action under an interpretation of the law in
203
conflict with the stated interpretation of the regulator. Neither rules
nor standards prevent such conduct, and, as between the two, rules
could even have the advantage in deterring it. Meanwhile, in every
case of a restatement, GAAP by definition has proved adequate to
the job of identifying the misstatement and providing corrective
instructions. Under this analysis, the drafters of Sarbanes-Oxley were
right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed to the
crisis but wrong in diagnosing the problem as legislative. This is not
for the most part a problem concerning the relative merits of rules
and standards in the drafting of statutes. It is instead a problem of
professional practice in a regulatory system made up of both. It is the
auditors who need to get back to principles, taking seriously

199. Id.
200. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 152–59 (explaining that the FASB
continues to establish financial accounting standards and due process procedures for the entire
economic community, not just public accountants).
201. The rule might be overinclusive; that is, it might bring inappropriate transactions into a
given zone of treatment. A rule also might be underinclusive; that is, it might allow a transaction
that should be included in a treatment category to be structured so as not to be included. Cass
R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 995 (1995).
202. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
571–77 (1992) (“[T]he greater the frequency with which a legal command will apply, the more
desirable rules tend to be relative to standards.”).
203. Malloy, supra note 197, at 29–31.
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principles already governing the reporting system and eschewing the
interests of agency beneficiaries.
GAAP, despite the derisory story currently circulating, is not
comprised solely of rules. It is a set of rules backed by a collection of
204
general standards. Together, these make up a body of law that is as
adequate for answering regulatory questions as any jurisprudence
applied by the legal profession. But the two professions play very
different roles when they apply law to fact. Where lawyers advocate
for their clients, auditors in theory act more like the police and
judiciary, applying the law to constrain their clients. Law-to-fact
applications accordingly bear critically on their professionalism. Any
departure from, or unprincipled application of, the rules in the
interest of advocacy compromises the mission. It follows that the
PCAOB will need to address the quality of the law-to-fact
determinations auditors make in their reviews of management’s
treatments. In so doing, the PCAOB will face a difficult task of
drawing a line between responsible applications of principles and
irresponsible advocacy. If it is to succeed at this, the PCAOB too will
have to take seriously the substance of GAAP.
A positivist concept of auditor responsibility does not hold out a
silver bullet that solves the problem of audit failure. Cognitive
limitations can impair audit quality even if the auditor has not been
captured by the client’s interest, whether conceived as the managers
or the shareholders.205 An auditor believing herself to be true to the
206
system can still be swayed by relational concerns. The point instead
is that as between an agency model and the system, the latter
provides the superior reference point for the pursuit of audit quality
and the analysis of audit failure. With the system as that professional
focal point, it is hoped that the professional accountability mechanism

204. For a survey of the general standards, see HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 20, at 67–
72. For discussion of the rules–standards interplay, see Ronen, supra note 187, at 62–64.
205. Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 143–63 (2000).
206. For a discussion of self serving bias in auditors, see Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good
Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS. REV. 96, 97 (2002).
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indirectly triggers constraints on the discretion managers exercise in
207
the choice of treatment. The shareholder will still have to be
modeled, but by the system’s legislature rather than its practitioners.

207. For a stronger variation on this theme, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL.
L. REV. 375, 417–19, 424–30 (1975) (arguing that either accounting principles must be drafted so
narrowly as to denude management of significant discretion in selection or the auditor should
make the selection).

